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I.

T

INTRODUCTION

HE purpose of this article is to suggest that there are occa-

sions in criminal trials when statutory and common law privileges that protect important and recognized social relationships
should be suspended in order to guarantee the defendant's fourteenth amendment right to a fair trial and sixth amendment right
to present evidence in his own behalf.
In criminal cases, the courts have long recognized that grand
juries (and ultimately trial juries) have a right to "every man's evidence."' While the courts have found this right to be sufficiently
important to overcome the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination, and even executive privilege, courts rarely have applied the right to overcome or suspend the non-constitutionally
based protection of what I shall call the "communication privileges" of attorney-client, husband-wife, doctor-patient, and other
similar relationships. This article attempts to demonstrate that
the logic that compels suspension of the fifth amendment privilege applies with equal force to suspend the communication
privileges.
The article urges that we can protect the defendant's rights
to a fair trial and to present evidence on his own behalf without
unduly infringing upon the relationships underlying the communication privileges by carefully applying use immunity to privileged revelations. Under the doctrine of use immunity, privileged
1. This language repeatedly has been employed in cases denying the existence or limiting the application of various privileges. See, e.g., Trammel v.
United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) (limiting application of privilege protecting adverse spousal testimony); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709

(1974) (overruling claim of executive privilege and allowing prosecutor access to
tape recordings); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972) (plurality opinion) (refusing to recognize that reporters have testimonial privilege in grand

jury investigations that others do not enjoy). Cf United States v. Bryan, 339
U.S. 323, 331 (1950) (recognizing duty to produce records before congressional

committee). Accord Blackmore v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932) (recognizing duty of United States citizen to testify at trial, even though citizen was

resident abroad); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281 (1919) (recognizing
duty to answer grand jury question subject to exceptions and qualifications);
Countess of Shrewsbury's Case, 2 How St. Tr. 769, 788 (1612).
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information is prohibited from being "used" to prosecute or convict the individual who the privilege protects. Thus, use immunity enables the defendant to obtain the evidence needed to
defend himself while protecting the privilege holder from the
threat of prosecution based on the contents of his privileged communications. In addition, the article suggests that the courts are
adequately equipped to protect against privileged information being used to harm the privilege holder's reputation or the relationship underlying the privilege. Where such harm is threatened,
however, the article suggests that the harm might be justified by
the avoidance of the greater harm to the criminal defendant,
which is secured by the limited invasion of the communication
privileges.
II.

THE PROBLEM:

A

CONFLICT OF RIGHTS

During a criminal trial it often is necessary for the defendant
to call a witness who possesses information that would demonstrate that the defendant did not commit the crime for which he
stands accused. Occasionally that witness will invoke one of several constitutional, statutory, or common law privileges. For example, in Commonwealth v. Wilkinson, 2 the defendant, on trial for
five murders, sought to call an associate to show that the associate, and not the defendant, had committed the offenses and had
advised both his lawyer and the prosecutor of this fact. 3 The associate, unable to secure a satisfactory arrangement with the prosecutor, acted on the advise of counsel, and successfully invoked
both the fifth amendment privilege against self incrimination and
the attorney-client privilege. The associate's attorney also successfully invoked the attorney-client privilege. 4 The defendant
was convicted and sentenced to five life terms. 5 Only after a
newspaper article in the Philadelphia Inquirer inspired federal investigation did the associate testify to his participation and exon6
erate the defendant.
2. No. 788-80 (C.P. Philadelphia County Nov. 1975) (no written opinion).
Unless otherwise noted, all information disclosed about this decision is derived
from an interview with Steven Laver, Assistant Defender, Philadelphia Defender
Association (counsel for witness) (Jan. 28 1985) [hereinafter cited as Laver
Interview].
3. Laver Interview, supra note 2.
4. Id.
5. Id. The prosecutor sought the death penalty even though he apparently
was aware of the witness' admission. Id.
6. Id. The newspaper article that appeared in the Philadelphia Inquirer
strongly suggested that Wilkinson had not been involved in the fatal firebomb-

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1985

3

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 6 [1985], Art. 7

1504

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30: p. 1501

Wilkinson is but one of many stark examples of the conflict
7
between the rights of criminal defendants and privilege holders.
How can we as a society assure that the truth will emerge in criminal trials? How can we protect and foster the defendant's constitutional rights to produce evidence on his behalf and to a fair
trial, while at the same time securing the interests and relationships that the constitutional, statutory, and common law privileges protect? This is a troublesome and serious enterprise.
Many scholars, critics, and judges have agonized over these
problems and through their efforts, I believe, a solution can be
patterned.8 The solution begins with an examination and amplification of the theoretical basis of these conflicting rights.
A.

Doctrinal Bases of the Defendant's Constitutional Rights to a Fair
Trial and to Offer Evidence on His Own Behalf

The rights of a defendant to a fair trial and to offer evidence
on his own behalf actually involve three separate constitutional
rights: the right of compulsory process, the right to confront adverse witnesses, and the right to due process. We will examine
these seriatim.
1.

The Compulsory Process Component

In 1967, the Warren Court breathed life into the dormant
compulsory process clause of the sixth amendment. In Washington
v. Texas, 9 the United States Supreme Court examined two provisions of Texas statutes preventing a defendant from calling an
ing. Schaffer & Neumann, Was Justice Done in a FatalFirebombing?, Philadelphia
Inquirer, Nov. 14, 1976, at 1, col. 1.
7. For a further discussion of this conflict, see infra note 47 and accompanying text.
8. See Westen, Incredible Dilemmas: ConditioningOne Constitutional Right on the
Forfeiture of Another, 66 IOWA L. REV. 741, 762 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Westen, Dilemmas]; Westen, Compulsory Process 11, 74 MICH. L. REV. 191 (1975); Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 71 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Westen, Compulsory Process Clause]; Note, Right of the Criminal Defendant to the Compelled Testimony of Witnesses, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 953 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Compelled Testimony]; Note, Separation of Powers and Defense Witness Immunity,
66 GEO. L.J. 51 (1977); Note, A Re-examination of Defense Witness Immunity: A New
Usefor Kastigar, 10 HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 74 (1972); Note, Defense Witness ImmunityA "Fresh" Look at the Compulsory Process Clause, 43 LA. L. REV. 239 (1982); Note,
Defendant v. Witness, Measuring Confrontationand Compulsory Process Rights Against
Statutory Communications Privileges, 30 STAN. L. REV. 935 (1978); Note, "The Public
has a Claim to Every Man's Evidence": The Defendant's Constitutional Right to Witness
Immunity, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1211 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note, Every Mans
Evidence].

9. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
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accomplice as a defense witness.1 0 The Court held that the provisions were unconstitutional on the ground that they violated the
defendant's fourteenth amendment right to due process of law 1
by virtue of their violation of the sixth amendment right to call
exculpatory witnesses as guaranteed by the specific language of
12
the compulsory process clause.
The Texas statutory provisions in question in Washington excluded an entire class of defense witnesses on the presumption
that accomplices would be biased in favor of their confederates. 13
The Court balanced the state's interests in excluding potentially
unreliable evidence against the defendant's interest in procuring
exculpatory testimony, and concluded that the greater weight was
with the defendant. ' 4 In so holding, the Washington Court permitted a long-recognized state interest to be overridden in order to
protect the defendant's compulsory process rights.
It is important to note that the Washington Court was not
presented with an invocation of the fifth amendment or with any
other witness privilege. In fact, the Court recognized that a class
of witnesses might be called to provide exculpatory evidence, and
that these witnesses, by virtue of various privileges, might be able
10. See id. at 16-17 n.4 (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 82 (Vernon 1925)
(repealed 1967); TEX. CODE GRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 711 (Vernon 1925) (repealed
by implication 1965)). The Court noted that these statutes were repealed by
implication, effective after defendant's trial. Id. at 17 n.4.
11. Id. at 18-19. The Court stated, "Just as an accused has the right to
confront the prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the right to present his own witness to establish a defense. This
right is a fundamental element of due process of Law." Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
12. Id. at 23. The sixth amendment provides, in pertinent part, that "[iun
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor ....
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
See also Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (1972) (trial judge's gratuitous admonition
to defense's only witness violated defendant's due process rights).
13. 388 U.S. at 22-23. The Court pointed out that the Texas rule provided
exceptions to the presumption when either the prosecution called the accomplice, or the accomplice had been acquitted at his own trial. Id. The Court
noted, however, that the accomplice has a greater incentive to commit perjury
when the prosecution calls the accomplice. Id. at 23.
14. Id. at 22-23. The Court commented that the Texas rule "arbitrarily denied [to the defendant] the right to put on the stand a witness." Id. at 23. The
Court viewed the fact that the statute did not prevent the prosecution from calling an accomplice "absurd" and suggested that the defense should be on an
equal footing with those of the prosecution in this regard. Id. at 22. The Court
commented that an accomplice-witness often has a greater incentive to lie for
the prosecution, especially if his trial is pending. Id. As the Court wryly pointed
out, "To think that criminals will lie to save their fellows but not to obtain favors
from the prosecution for themselves is indeed to clothe the criminal class with
more nobility than one might expect to find in the public at large." Id. at 22-23.
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to withhold evidence. 15 Limiting its holding accordingly, the
Court explicitly stated that it did not reach the issue of testimonial
privileges. 16 Thus, under Washington the constellation of interests,
privacy rights, and immunities that coalesce in the communication privileges remained beyond the reach of probing defense
attorneys.
2.

The Confrontation Clause Component

Numerous confrontation clause cases have forced the
Supreme Court to address serious issues of a witness' right to privacy,' 7 but prior to Davis v. Alaska 18 the Supreme Court had not
dealt with a codified state policy to protect a witness. In Davis, the
Court considered the applicability of the sixth amendment to a
state statute that made the juvenile court records of a prosecution
witness confidential.' 9 Davis involved a burglary trial in which the
prosecution's witness was on probation for a prior juvenile adjudication of delinquency for burglarizing two cabins. 20 The defense contended that evidence of the witness' criminal record
should be admitted to show bias and prejudice on the part of the
witness, 21 but the trial court ruled that the defense could not
cross-examine the witness on that point. 22
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that while the purpose of
the statute-promoting the rehabilitative process-was laudatory,
it nevertheless violated the defendant's sixth amendment right to
15. Id. at 23.
16. Id. at 23 n.21. The Court noted that testimonial privileges are based on
entirely different considerations than are disqualifications for interest. Id.
17. See, e.g., Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 131-33, (1968) (witness required to reveal legal name and address); Alfrod v. United States, 282 U.S. 687,
693-94 (1931) (witness required to reveal that he was in custody of federal authorities to show bias and interest).
18. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
19. Id. at 309, 315. The Alaska statute provided that evidence of a juvenile
adjudication was not admissible "against the minor in any other court." ALAsKA
47
STAT. §
.10.0 8 0 (g) (1984).
20. 415 U.S. at 310-11. The witness identified the defendant as one of the
men he had seen on his stepfather's property near the spot where a stolen safe
was recovered. Id. at 309-10.
21. Id. at 311. Defense counsel asserted that he would not use the witness'
record to question the general character of the witness, but would use the evidence only to demonstrate bias and prejudice. Id.
22. Id. The protective order against introducing evidence of the witness'
probation was accomplished by a motion in limine made by the prosecution. Id.
at 310. In addition, during cross-examination the trial court sustained an objection to questioning of the witness pertaining to any prior contact with the police.
Id. at 313. Thus, defense counsel was effectively denied the opportunity to
prove the witness' probationary status.
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confront the witnesses against him. 23 The Court balanced the

state interest against the defendant's right to demonstrate bias
and prejudice on the part of the witness. 24 In concluding that the
trial court erred, the Court stated, "Serious damage to the
strength of the State's case would have been a real possibility had
petitioner been allowed to pursue this line of inquiry. In this setting we conclude that the right of confrontation is paramount to
25
the State's policy of protecting a juvenile offender."
With regard to the witness' rights to privacy and anonymity,
the Court stated, "[W]hatever temporary embarrassment might
result to [the witness] or his family by disclosure of his juvenile
record ...

is outweighed by petitioner's right to probe into the in-

fluence of possible bias in the testimony of a crucial identification
witness." 2 6 In employing the term "outweighed," the Court indicated that the question of sixth amendment rights vis a vis the
rights of witnesses was to be decided by balancing interests and
needs.
Although the Davis Court did not invalidate any communication privileges, the Court's holding that the privacy interests of a
juvenile are outweighed by the defendant's sixth amendment
rights lends substantial support to the argument that such privileges should yield to the sixth amendment in certain cases. 2 7 The
approach outlined in Davis would be of limited use, however, in
23. Id. at 319-20.
24. Id. The Court characterized the right to cross-examine an adverse witness effectively for bias as a "constitutional right." Id. at 320.
25. Id. at 319. The Court advised that where the state wants to protect the
witness, in the interest of fairness it can choose not to call the witness. Id. at
320.
26. Id. at 319 (emphasis added).
27. Cf Salazar v. Alaska, 559 P.2d 66, 76-79 (Alaska 1976) (defendant
should be allowed to call prosecution witness' wife over claim of marital privilege when the privilege is in conflict with defendant's right of confrontation);
State v. Hembd, 305 Minn. 120, 1126-27; 232 N.W.2d 872, 876 (Minn. 1975)
(confrontation right supersedes statutory physician-patient privilege to allow use
of medical records to show previous suicide attempt); In re Kozlov, 79 N.J. 232,
240-45, 398 A.2d 882, 885-88 (1979) (attorney-client privilege no bar to defendant's right to prove juror misconduct where there is no less obtrusive source);
State v. Roma, 140 N.J. Super. 582, 592, 357 A.2d 45, 51 (1976) (statutory privilege for communications to marriage counsellor "must yield to the constitutional rights of a defendant to present an adequate defense"), opinion
supplemented, 143 NJ. Super. 504, 363 A.2d 923 (1976); Oregon v. Jalo, 27 Or.
App. 845, 850-51, 557 P.2d 1359, 1362 (1976) (rape shield law no bar to crossexamination); Texas Bd. of Pardons & Paroles v. Miller, 590 S.W.2d 142, 143-45
(Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (confidential letter in parole records protected by state
law privilege is subject to in camera review in criminal trial to determine if letter
tends to show bias or prejudice by letter writer).
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many cases involving communication privileges because it fails to
address the problem of protecting the privilege-holder from future investigations or prosecution.
3.

The Due Process Clause Component

In Chambers v. Mississippi,2s the Supreme Court held that Mississippi's common-law role barring the defendant from impeaching his own witness and from introducing exculpatory out-ofcourt declarations against penal interest violated the defendant's
rights to due process and to compulsory process. 2 9 Again, the
Court reached its decision after balancing the purported state interests against the defendant's right to a fair trial, concluding that
the defendant's constitutional rights outweighed the state inter0
ests at issue.3
In Chambers, the defendant, on trial for murder, sought to
prove that a witness, McDonald, committed the crime. McDonald, who had confessed to the murder in a signed, sworn statement, was called as a defense witness. 3 ' On direct examination,
McDonald admitted that he had signed the statement, and it was
introduced into evidence. 3 2 On cross-examination, however, McDonald refused to adopt the statement, claiming that he did not
commit the crime, and that he had signed the statement only because he had been promised a share in the award that the defendant would get from successfully suing the police department after
his acquittal. 3 3 When defense counsel sought to impeach McDonald on redirect examination, he was prevented from doing so by
operation of the voucher rule.3 4 Chambers sought to call other
witnesses to whom McDonald had made statements concerning
28. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
29. Id. at 302. Chambers' request to cross-examine a key witness was denied because under Mississippi common-law, "a party may not impeach his own
witnesses." Id. at 295. Under this rule there is a presumption that a party who
calls a witness "vouches for his credibility." Id.
30. Id. at 295-98. The Court balanced the defendant's constitutional right
to cross-examine against the state "voucher rule," which prohibited a party from
impeaching his own witness. Id.
31. Id. at 291. Defense counsel made a pre-trial motion to declare McDonald an adverse witness since the prosecution would not call McDonald. Id. The
trial court denied the motion, concluding that while the witness might have been
hostile, he was not adverse. Id.
32. Id. Apparently, defense counsel did not on direct ask McDonald to admit the truth of his confession nor did he ask him to relate the events surrounding the murder. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 291-92. Counsel's pretrial motion to call McDonald as an adverse
witness was again denied after the state's cross-examination. Id. at 291.
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his involvement in the shooting.3 5 These witnesses also were prevented from testifying because Mississippi did not recognize declarations against penal interest as exceptions to the hearsay
36
rule.
In graphic language, the Supreme Court reversed Chambers'
conviction. The Court held that the isolated and combined effects of the state's evidentiary rules deprived the defendant of his
constitutional right to both a fair trial and to compulsory process.
B.

Privileges in Conflict with the Defendant's Rights

Washington, Davis, and Chambers established that a defendant
possesses a constitutional right to call or to cross-examine witnesses who possess material exculpatory information.3 7 These
decisions indicate that a balancing test is implicated whenever
statutes, rules of evidence, or public policy prevent a defendant
38
from exercising either of these rights.
The communication privileges often prevent defendants
from calling or cross-examining witnesses who possess material
or exculpatory evidence. Thus, the issue comes to focus: Does
the right to offer a defense compel a limited invasion of the communication privileges?
The Supreme Court of the United States has not addressed
the conflict between the communication privileges and the defendant's right to present exculpatory evidence. The interests
protected by the communication privileges, however, are no more
basic or fundamental than are the rights protected by the sixth
and fourteenth amendments at issue in Washington, Davis, and
Chambers.
35. Id. at 292-93. Defendant offered three witnesses to testify that McDonald had told them that he had done the shooting; but, the trial court excluded
the testimony on hearsay grounds. Id.
36. Id. at 292-93, 299. The only declaration against interest exception that
Mississippi recognized was the declaration against pecuniary interest. Id. at 299.
The Court concluded:
The testimony rejected by the trial court here bore persuasive assurances of trustworthiness.... That testimony was also critical to Chambers' defense. In these circumstances, where constitutional rights
directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay
rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice.
Id. at 302.
37. See generally Westen, Confrontationand Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory
of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 HARV. L. REv. 567, 625 (1978) ("confrontation
and compulsory process both entitle a defendant to present a defense by guaranteeing him the right to produce and present evidence through witnesses at
trial").
38. See id. at 613-28.
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In United States v. Nixon, 39 the Supreme Court denied the

President's claim of executive privilege for materials the special
prosecutor had subpoenaed for trial. 40 In holding that the President's executive privilege had to yield, the Court cited the Government's need for "every man's evidence" and the defendants'
constitutional rights to compulsory process, confrontation, and
due process. 4 ' As with all privileges, the Court weighed "the importance of the general privilege of confidentiality of Presidential
communications... against the inroads of such a privilege on the
fair administration of criminal justice. ' 42 Explaining the balancing process, the Court detailed the procedure for an in camera inspection of the subpoenaed material. According to the Court, a
district court should, upon a claim of privilege by the President,
indulge in a presumption that the material is privileged, and place
the burden upon the subpoenaing party to demonstrate that the
presidential materials are "essential to the justice of the [pending
criminal] case." 43 If the subpoenaing party satisfies its burden of
demonstrating the essential nature of the subpoenaed material,
then the district court should conduct an in camera inspection of
the material. The court has "a very heavy responsibility to see to
it that presidential conversations, which are either not relevant or
not admissible, are accorded that high degree of respect due to
the President of the United States .... It is therefore necessary in

the public interest to afford presidential confidentiality the great44
est protection consistent with the fair administration ofjustice."
Although Nixon did not involve a defendant's request for
39. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
40. Id. at 713. The subpoena directed the President to turn over certain
tape recordings and documents relating to conversations with his advisors. Id.
at 686. The President claimed an absolute executive privilege, which the district
court rejected. Id.
41. Id. at 709-11. The defendants in the underlying criminal proceeding
were seven associates of President Nixon. The Court commented that "[t]o ensure that justice is done, it is imperative to the function of courts that compulsory process be available for the production of evidence needed either by
prosecution or by the defense." Id. at 709.
42. Id. at 711-12. The Court concluded that the constitutional need for
production of evidence was "specific and central to the fair adjudication of a
particular criminal case" and outweighed the general executive need for confidentiality of communications. Id. at 712-13.
43. Id. at 713 (quoting United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 192 (C.C. Va.
1807) (No. 14,694)) (brackets added by Nixon Court). The Court concluded that
the district court had complied with this procedure. Id. at 713-14.
44. Id. at 714-15. Due to the sensitive nature of presidential communications, the Court repeatedly emphasized the need for confidentiality of all material not relevant to the issues before the Court. Id.
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privileged materials, the Court nevertheless discussed the claim
of executive privilege in the broader context of all privileges and
noted, "Whatever their origins, these exceptions to the demand
for every man's evidence are not lightly created nor expansively
45
construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth."
The Court added that a criminal defendant enjoys similar, constitutional protections, stating, "It is the manifest duty of the courts
to vindicate those guarantees [of due process, confrontation, and
compulsory process] and to accomplish that it is essential that all
46
relevant and admissible evidence be produced."
Thus, the Nixon decision strongly suggests that the constitutional rights of a defendant can compel the admission of even
privileged material. Moreover, the procedure for production set
forth in Nixon can be a model for the review of a privilege holder's
request to quash a subpoena.
Another, more frequently litigated privilege is the privilege
that inheres in the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. In these cases, courts typically are confronted with conflicts
among the Government's interest in prosecuting coconspirators,
the defendant's rights to a fair trial and to offer evidence in his
own behalf, and a witness' fifth amendment right against selfincrimination.
To illustrate this conflict, consider the following hypothetical
situation. Assume that the Defendant (D) called a witness (W)
who had previously admitted to committing the crime with which
D is charged. Instead of testifying and either admitting or denying the crime, however, let us assume that W invoked his fifth
amendment right against self-incrimination. Under the traditional view of immunity, invocation of his fifth amendment privilege would end the matter as neither the defendant nor the court
could compel W to testify. Assume further that W had admitted
the crime to his lawyer, his wife, and his psychiatrist. If each of
these persons was called as a witness, each would be required to
invoke the applicable statutory or common law communication
privilege, and would thereby refuse to testify. In contrast, if the
Government called W, it could immunize W, and W would be able
to testify without fear that the testimony could or would be used
against W. The defendant, however, lacks the power to immunize
a witness, and often must forego the opportunity to call a witness
who is protected by a privilege.
45. Id. at 710.
46. Id. at 711.
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What then becomes of the defendant's constitutional right to
offer a defense when the defendant is powerless to compel a witness to testify on the defendant's behalf? Under the traditional
view of privilege, the defendant's rights would be defeated. In
the face of such conflicts, courts have crafted the device of "severance," which allows a defendant to elicit exculpatory evidence
from a codefendant, even if the codefendant's testimony would be
self-incriminating. The device simultaneously prevents the use of
such evidence against that particular codefendant-witness by trying the defendant and his codefendant separately. 4 7 Through
47. See DeLuna v. United States, 308 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1962), reh'g denied,
324 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1963). In DeLuna, the Fifth Circuit stated, in dicta, that if
an attorney's duty to his client requires him to draw the jury's attention to a
possible inference of guilt from a codefendant's silence, then the trial judge's
duty is to order a severance. 308 F.2d at 141. The court concluded that a defendant who exercises his fifth amendment right has the right to be free from
prejudicial comments made by the state or by a codefendant's attorney. Id. at
152. Essentially, DeLuna suggests that a court should order a severance to preserve both codefendants' constitutional rights, when one's right to a fair trial
conflicts with the other's right to be free from prejudicial comment. Id. at 15455. The Fifth Circuit subsequently has stated that an attorney's duty to comment on a codefendant's silence arises only where the defenses of the codefendants are antagonistic. Gurleski v. United States, 405 F.2d 253, 265 (5th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 981 (1969).
Some circuits have read the DeLuna dicta narrowly or have rejected it completely. See, e.g., United States v. McClure, 734 F.2d 484, 490-91 (10th Cir.
1984) (rejecting DeLuna dicta and holding that under no circumstances is a defendant's attorney "obligated to comment upon a codefendant's failure to testify"); United States v. Graziano, 710 F.2d 691, 694-95 (lth Cir. 1983) (to
prevail upon severance claim, defendant must show that he will suffer real prejudice and that unfair trial will result form his attorney's inability to comment on
codefendant's refusal to testify; real prejudice occurs only if defenses of codefendants are mutually exclusive and antagonistic), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 937
(1984). See also Byrd v. Wainwright, 428 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1970). Byrd involved the conflict between codefendants' rights in a joint trial. One codefendant desired to offer exculpatory testimony of another codefendant who had
exercised his fifth amendment right to remain silent. Id. at 1018. To preserve
the defendant's right to a fair trial, the Court concluded that the trial court
should have granted severance. Id. In determining whether severance was appropriate, the court focused on three factors: (1) the defendant's desire to use
the exculpatory testimony of the codefendant; (2) the exculpatory nature and
effect of the testimony or the extent of prejudice if the defendant is tried without
the codefendant's testimony; and (3) the likeihood that the codefendant will be
willing to testify if defendant is tried separately. Id. at 1019-21. The court listed
but did not reach two other factors to be considered when determining if the
codefendant should be tried separately: (4) the demands of effective judicial
administration and timeliness of raising the severance question; and (5) the
probability that a codefendant will prejudice the defendant by pleading guilty at
or just prior to trial. Id. Defense witness immunity was never raised by counsel
or the Byrd court.
Other circuits have adopted severance criteria similar to that established by
the Fifth Circuit in Byrd. See, e.g., United States v. Lemonakis, 485 F.2d 941, 95153 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (counsel's duty to comment exists only where defenses
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severance, the defendant's right to offer a defense can coexist
raised are truly antagonistic, and indicating that duty to comment diminishes as
defenses become less antangonistic, but that right to silence without prejudicial
comment thereon is not proportionately diluted), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989
(1974); United States v. Barber, 442 F.2d 517, 529-30 (3d Cir.) (mere presence
of hostility among codefendants is not sufficient grounds for severance), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 958 (1971); United States v. De LaCruz Bellinger, 422 F.2d 723,
726-27 (9th Cir.) (there is no absolute rule of severance, rather defendant must
show he would have benefited from comment on codefendant's refusal to testify), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 942 (1970); United States v. Caci, 401 F.2d 664, 67172 (2d Cir. 1968) (DeLuna should be applied only in cases where defendant can
show "real prejudice" if he is not permitted to comment on silence of codefendant); United States v. McKinney, 379 F.2d 259, 265 (6th Cir. 1967) (attorney's
comment upon defendant's silence would not be permissible); United States v.
Kahn, 381 F.2d 824, 840 (7th Cir.) (requiring showing that real prejudice will
result from defendant's inability to comment upon codefendant's silence), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 1015 (1967); United States v. Buschman, 386 F. Supp. 822, 825
(E.D. Wis. 1975) ("inability to comment upon codefendant's refusal to testify
compels severance only where defendants have mutually exclusive, antagonistic
defenses"), afd on other grounds, 527 F.2d 1082 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Barber, 297 F. Supp. 917, 920 (D. Del. 1969) (to the extent DeLuna permits
counsel to comment upon failure of any codefendant to testify, DeLuna, if not an
"aberration," is confined to special fact situation not present in case at bar). See
also United States v. Johnson, 713 F.2d 633, 640-41 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1081 (1984); United States v. Boscia, 573 F.2d 827, 832 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied 436 U.S. 911 (1978); United States v. Becker, 585 F.2d 703, 706-07 (4th
Cir. 1978) (before granting severance, trial judge must determine whether there
is "reasonable probability" that exculpatory testimony will be forthcoming, and
whether codefendant will waive his fifth amendment right at a separate trial),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1080 (1979); United States v. Kaplan, 554 F.2d 958, 966-67
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 956 (1977); United States v. Finkelstein, 526 F.2d
517, 523-25 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. Scardino v. United States, 425
U.S. 960 (1976); United States v. Echeles, 352 F.2d 892, 898 (7th Cir. 1965)
(addressing court's power to arrange order of trials).
InJohnson, the Eleventh Circuit explained that a defendant "must initially
prove bona fide need for the testimony, the substance of the desired testimony,
the exculpatory effect of the desired testimony, and [that] the co-defendant
would indeed have testified at a separate trial." 713 F.2d at 640 (quoting United
States v. Marable, 574 F.2d 224, 231 (5th Cir. 1978)). The Johnson court added
that after the defendant satisfies his initial burden of proof, it becomes the
court's responsibility to assess the significance of the alleged exculpatory evidence, the potential prejudice that might result without the benefit of the testimony, the concern for judicial economy, and the timeliness of the motion. Id. at
641.
The Third Circuit in Boscia emphasized the following four factors for determining whether to grant a severance:
(1) The likelihood of codefendants testifying.
(2) The degree to which such testimony would be exculpatory.
(3) The degree to which the testifying codefendants could be
impeached.
(4) Judicial economy.
573 F.2d at 832.
Similarly, in Kaplan, the Ninth Circuit offered the following factors for a trial
court to weigh:
(1) The good faith of defendant's intent to have codefendant testify.
(2) The potential weight and credibility of the predicted testimony.
(3) The probability that such testimony will materialize.
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with the witness' right to invoke a privilege. Thus, where one
joint defendant possesses information that will exculpate another
joint defendant (for example, where W and D are joint defendants), but invokes his fifth amendment right to remain silent, a
court has the inherent power to grant a severance-thereby protecting both the non-testifying defendant's fifth amendment right
and the other defendant's right to present exculpatory evidence.
The severance remedy, however, will not enable D to reach the
testimony of Ws spouse, attorney, or psychiatrist. The severance
remedy is also inadequate when W persists in his refusal to testify.
III.

THE THEORY OF USE IMMUNITY

As the courts have the inherent power to grant a severance,
they also possess the inherent power to grant use immunity. If
the law and logic of use immunity is applied to each privilege, it is
clear that the witness, his lawyer, wife, and therapist can be compelled to testify without any real damage to either their privileges
or to the underlying relationships. In order to understand how
use immunity can apply to privileges, it is necessary to examine
the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on use immunity.
In Kastigar v. United States, 4 8 the Supreme Court considered
the constitutionality of a federal statute that authorized the Government to grant use immunity to a witness, and to compel the
witness to testify despite an invocation of the fifth amendment. 49
(4)

The economy of a joint trial.

(5)

The possibility that the trial strategy of a codefendant, such as

pleading guilty, will prejudice the defendant seeking severance.
554 F.2d at 966.
Finally, the Second Circuit in Finkelstein found that the relevant criteria include, but are not limited to, the following:
(1) The sufficiency of a showing that a codefendant would testify at a
severed trial and waive his fifth amendment privilege.
(2) The degree to which the exculpatory testimony would be
cumulative.
(3) The counter-arguments of a judicial economy.
(4) The likelihood that the testimony would be subject to damaging
impeachment.
526 F.2d at 525.
48. 406 U.S. 441 (1972). In Kastigar, defendants were committed into the
custody of the United States Attorney General for failure to answer grand jury
questions despite a grant of use immunity. Id. at 442. The defendants contended that the court should have granted them transactional immunity so that
they would be immune from prosecution for offenses relating to the compelled
testimony. Id. at 443.
49. See 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1982). The statute provides, in pertinent part,
that "no testimony or other information compelled under the order ... may be
used against the witness in any criminal case." Id. (emphasis added).
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In specifically rejecting a claim that the fifth amendment required
transactional immunity, the Court explained that the fifth amendment privilege never was viewed as protecting its holder from all
prosecution. 5 0 The Court reasoned that the fifth amendment affords its holder protection only from the use as compelled testimony or evidence derived directly and indirectly therefrom. 5'
The Court noted that use immunity prohibits the prosecutorial
authorities from using compelled testimony "in any respect, and it
therefore insures that the testimony cannot lead to the infliction
of criminal penalties on the witness." 52 Thus, the Court concluded that use immunity "is coextensive with the scope of the
privilege against self-incrimination, and therefore is sufficient to
53
compel testimony over a claim of the privilege."
The Kastigar Court noted that its previous decision in Murphy
55
v. Waterfront Commission5 4 had tacitly approved of use immunity.
In Murphy, the Court held that a state has authority to confer immunity on a witness, and that this protects the witness from the
use of his testimony in afederal prosecution. 56 In both Murphy and
Kastigar, the Court implicitly acknowledged that, by granting use
immunity, a prosecutorial authority in one jurisdiction (state or
federal) possesses the power to tie the hands of a prosecutor in
another jurisdiction, without any advance approval. 57 Thus, in
50. 406 U.S. at 453. The Court indicated that the purpose of the fifth
amendment was not to grant to an individual full immunity from prosecution,
but only to protect him from the infliction of penalties on the basis of the compelled testimony. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. The Court explained that the Government bears the burden of proving that evidence was derived "from a legitimate source wholly independent of
the compelled testimony," whenever the Government seeks to offer evidence
against a witness who previously was compelled to testify after being granted use
immunity. Id. at 460. Thus, the use of the compelled testimony for "investigatory leads," and the use of "any evidence obtained by focusing investigation on
a witness as a result of his compelled testimony for "investigatory leads," and
the use of "any evidence obtained by focusing investigation on a witness as a
result of his compelled disclosures" is proscribed. See id. at 460 (citing Alberston v. Subsersion Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 80 (1965)). For a discussion dealing with the prosecution's difficult burden to show an independent
source, see Flanagan, Compelled Immunity for Defense Witnesses: Hidden Costs and
Questions, 56 NOTRE DAME LAw. 447, 457-461 (1981).
53. 406 U.S. at 453.
54. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
55. 406 U.S. at 457-58. The Court indicated that prior to Kastigar it had
never squarely confronted the question of the sufficiency of use immunity in the
context of compelled testimony and fifth amendment rights. Id.
56. 378 U.S. at 77-78.
57. See id. at 79; Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 456-57. In Murphy, the defendants
refused to answer questions because although they were granted immunity from

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1985

15

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 6 [1985], Art. 7

1516

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30: p. 1501

both cases, the Court went to some lengths to save the immunity

expanding the effect of the immunity
statute at issue byjudicially
58
granted therein.
The Supreme Court also has permitted the Government's
need for testimony to overcome a defendant's claim of spousal
immunity. In Trammel v. United States, 59 the Court held that while
the government could neither compel nor prevent testimony
from the defendant's spouse, the government could immunize a
spouse who was willing to testify about non-confidential communications and acts that occured in the presence of third persons,
despite the defendant spouse's claim of spousal immunity. 60 The
Court relied on the public's right to every man's evidence, noting

that "a rule of evidence that permits an accused to prevent adfar more likely to frustrate justice
verse spousal testimony seems
6'
peace."
than to foster family
state prosecution they were not granted immunity from federal prosecution in
the event their answers incriminated them under federal law. 378 U.S. at 53-54.
The defendants were thereupon held in contempt of court. Id. at 54. The
Supreme Court reversed, holding "the constitutional rule to be that a state witness may not be compelled to give testimony which may be incriminating under
federal law unless the compelled testimony and its fruits cannot be used in any
manner by federal officials in connection with a criminal prosecution against
him." Id. at 79. In order to implement the rule, the Court held that once the
state has granted a defendant immunity, the Federal Government is prohibited
from using the testimony. Id. Similarly, federal witnesses granted immunity
from federal prosecution are protected from state prosecution as well. Kastigar,
406 US. at 456-57.
The Murphy holding was reaffirmed in Kastigar. Id. at 460. Furthermore, in
Kastigar the Court reaffirmed that once a person is accorded use immunity, "the
prosecution has the affirmative duty to prove that the evidence it proposes to
use is derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled
testimony. Id.
58. See 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1982) (federal statute in question in Kastigar);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 32:23-86(5) (West 1963 & Supp. 1984-1985) (statute implicated in Murphy). The Murphy Court held that "the Federal Government must
be prohibited from making any such use of compelled testimony in a state proceeding and its fruits." 378 U.S. at 79 (also quoted in Kastigar,406 U.S. at 457).
59. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
60. Id. 51-53.
61. Id. at 50, 52. In Trammel, the defendant claimed that the district court
committed reversible error in admitting his wife's adverse testimony despite his
objections. Id. at 43. Trammel claimed that this testimony was barred by the
Hawkins rule, which prevented one spouse from testifying adversely against the
other. Id. at 46 (citing Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958)). The
Court in rejecting the Hawkins rule held that the "contemporary justification for
affording an accused such a privilege [marital harmony] is ...unpersuasive." Id.
at 52. The Court noted that because the Government is unlikely to grant the
defendant's wife immunity if it knows she cannot testify adversely against him,
the rule is more likely to undermine the marital relationship. Id. at 52-53. Afterhardly seems conducive to the preservation of the marital relation to
all, "[i]t
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This brings us to the question of whether a court possesses
authority to bind a prosecutor by the creation of use immunity.
A.

The Authority of Courts to Grant Witnesses Use Immunity

In Kastigar, the Supreme Court interpreted legislation authorizing a member of the executive branch to apply to a court for
immunity for an individual appearing before an agency of the
United States. 6 2 It has been widely held that a court's role upon
receiving such a request from the prosecution is ministerial in nature. 63 When a defendant seeks to obtain an immunity grant for a
witness, however, he is faced with the dilemma of asking the prosecution to immunize his witness-thereby disclosing his case to
the prosecutor-or not calling the witness at all. 64 The issues
thus arise: May defense counsel apply directly to the court for
assistance and, if so, does the court have the power to create
immunity?
In Simmons v. United States,65 the Supreme Court created the
functional equivalent of use immunity for a defendant who was
required to establish standing to suppress illegally seized evidence. In order to establish standing, a defendant in Simmons,
Garrett, testified at a suppression hearing that a seized suitcase
belonged to him. 66 At the subsequent trial, the government introduced the suppression hearing testimony, and it was admitted
against Garrett. 6 7 On appeal, however, the Supreme Court concluded that the evidence was inadmissable.
The Court held that a criminal defendant could not be placed
in a constitutional dilemma, requiring him to sacrifice one constiplace a wife in jeopardy solely by virtue of her husband's control over her testimony." Id. at 53.
62. 406 U.S. at 441. See 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (1982). Section 6003 provides
that the order for immunity is granted at the request of the United States Attorney. Id.
63. See Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 431-34 (1956) (district court
has no discretion in granting immunity under Immunity Act of 1954); Herman v.
United States, 589 F.2d 1191, 1200-02 (3d Cir. 1978) (judicial review of a federal prosecutor's decision to grant immunity is barred by statute), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 913 (1979).
64. See United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 190 (3d Cir. 1973) (court
has no authority to grant immunity or demand prosecution to seek immunity for
defense witnesses).
65. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
66. Id. at 381. The district court denied the motion to suppress the suitcase. Id.
67. Id. Prior to Simmons, the majority of the federal courts of appeals had
held that suppression hearing testimony was admissible at trial if the motion to
suppress failed. Id. at 392 & n.16.
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tutional right in order to assert another right. 68 The Court reasoned that in such circumstances it is "intolerable that one
constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another." 6 9 It ruled "that when a defendant testifies in support of a motion to suppress evidence on fourth amendment
grounds, his testimony may not thereafter be admitted against him at
70
trial on the issue of guilt."
While the Simmons Court never used the term "immunity," it
7
is clear that the effect of its holding was to create use immunity. '
This remedy was created to protect the fourth amendment right
without sacrificing the fifth amendment right. Simmons is a classic
example of the Court using its inherent authority in aid of constitutional protections. This aid was necessary because constitutional protections have developed more rapidly than the
evidentiary rules surrounding a trial. Because of this lag in the
development of the rules of evidence, it was necessary for the
Court to use its inherent power to prevent an obvious disadvantage to one side in criminal trials. 72 Simmons thus represents a
judicial solution to an otherwise insoluble constitutional dilemma. 73 The Court's power to fashion the use immunity remedy
was hardly noticed and the criminal justice system learned to
work with the new rule to the extent that it subsequently abolished the need for an independent inquiry into a defendant's
standing to challenge the legality of a search where the defendant
74
is charged with possessory offenses.
Simmons provides a helpful analytic tool for a defendant requesting a court to immunize a defense witness, but few courts
have applied the rationale of Simmons outside of the standing con68. Id. at 394. The Court concluded that a defendant must not have to
choose between the privilege against self-incrimination and the right against illegal searches and seizures. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. (emphasis added).
71. See Westen, Dilemmas, supra note 8, at 763 ("Simmons itself involved the
granting of use immunity by the courts .... ")..
72. See Natali, Green, Dutton and Chambers: Three Cases in Search of a Theory,
7 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 43, 44 (1975). See also Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967)
(courts must suppress evidence of prior conviction obtained without benefit of
counsel).
73. For a critical discussion of the casual use of the term "constitutional
dilemma," see generally Westen, Dilemmas, supra note 8.
74. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104-06 (1980) (no separate inquiry into standing to challenge legality of "search" is required; test is simply
whether defendant had any expectation of privacy in the goods).
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text. 75 In addition, the lower courts have refused to grant immu75. See, e.g., United States v. Lenz, 616 F.2d 960, 962 (6th Cir. 1980) (rejecting defendant's request for use immunity for witnesses as part of his compulsory process right), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 929 (1980). California courts, however,
have long recognized the necessity to grant use immunity. See Byers v. Justice
Court, 71 Cal. 2d 1039, 458 P.2d 465, 80 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1969) (statute which
compels hit and run driver to reveal certain information does not involve risks of
self-incrimination), rev 'd on other grounds sub nom. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424
(1971). In Byers, the California Supreme Court upheld its hit-and-run statute
against a fifth amendment challenge, holding that any person who did stop and
report his involvement was immunized from the use of his statements rendered
at the time of the stop. 71 Cal. 2d at 1056, 458 P.2d at 477, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 565.
The court noted that providing use immunity would not "unduly hamper criminal prosecutions." Id. at 1054, 458 P.2d at 475, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 563. This principle found wide recognition in civil cases. See Daly v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d
132, 560 P.2d 1193, 137 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1977). In Daly, the court held that a
private party in a civil action could request use immunity in order to discover
information in a deposition. Id. at 151, 560 P.2d at 1205, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 26.
The Daly court required the party requesting the grant of immunity to notify the
prosecuting agency of the proposed immunity, and stated that the agency was
entitled to object on the grounds such use would unduly hamper future prosecution. Id. at 148, 560 P.2d at 1203-04, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 24. In addition, the court
concluded that an objection by the prosecuting agency would conclusively establish that the immunity order would hamper criminal prosecution. Id. at 148, 560
P.2d at 1204, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 25. Section 2019 of the California Code of Civil
Procedure, from which the Byers court derived its power in part, permits the
California courts to make any order "to protect the party or witness from annoyance, embarrassment or oppression." CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 2019(b)(1) (West
1983 & Supp. 1986). See Gonzalez v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 57, 178
Cal. Rptr. 358 (1980) (answers to interrogatories in civil paternity suit were immunized to prevent use of criminal proceedings); Rysdale v. Santa Barbara Superior Court, 81 Cal. App. 3d 280, 146 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1978) (in civil proceeding
preceding criminal action, if city grants immunity from prosecution to any of
eight defendants to obtain testimony, then all defendants must be granted use
immunity with respect to such compelled testimony and evidence derived therefrom); Tarantino v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. App. 3d 465, 122 Cal. Rptr. 61
(1975) (statutory power to order competency examination implies power by authorizing court to grant use immunity for answers given to psychiatrists). See also
DeCamp v. First Kensington Corp., 83 Cal. App. 3d 268, 147 Cal. Rptr. 869
(1978) (although defendant is required to verify his answer in civil suit, he is
entitled to use immunity for his answer in any criminal prosecution). See generally
Note, Every Man's Evidence, supra note 8, at 1217 n.31.
While California courts consistently have granted use immunity to defense
witnesses in civil cases, in criminal cases the courts have not followed Byers. In
fact, the California courts consistently have denied requests to grant use immunity to defense witnesses. See, e.g., People v. DeFreitas, 140 Cal. App. 3d 835,
189 Cal. Rptr. 814 (1983); People v. Traylor, 23 Cal. App. 3d 323, 332, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 116, 121 (1972) (court rejected defendant's equal protection argument
that since right to grant immunity is afforded to prosecution, it must be afforded
to defendant).
The De Freitas court considered § 1324 of the California Penal Code, which
speaks only in terms of transactional immunity. 140 Cal. App. 3d at 839, 189
Cal. Rptr. at 817 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 1324 (West 1983)). Deeming itself
bound by earlier California authority, the court refused to expand § 1324 to
grant immunity to defense witnesses. 140 Cal. App. 3d 841, 189 Cal. Rptr. at
818.
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76
nity, relying on the substantive ground of separation of powers
77
or the procedural ground of insufficiency of the request.
The denial of use immunity on the ground of separation of
powers rests on the rationale that the granting of immunity to a
witness is an executive function, and that courts should not tread
upon the prosecutional discretion of the executive branch. 78 The
major decision in this regard is Earl v. United States, 79 written by
then circuit Judge Warren Burger. Earl has been mechanically,
almost blindly, followed,8 0 but it should be discarded for the following reasons:

(1) Earl was decided prior to Simmons, which provided
that courts could immunize defense witnesses in order to protect constitutional rights; 8
(2) Earl was decided before Kastigar approved of use
immunity as the only type of immunity constitution82
ally required by the fifth amendment;
76. See, e.g., United States v. Turkish 623 F.2d 769, 776 (2d Cir. 1980)
("confronting the prosecutor with a choice between terminating prosecution of
the defendant or jeopardizing prosecution of the witness is not a task congenial
to the judicial function"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981). For a list of cases
where the court denied immunity on the ground of separation of powers, see
infra note 107.
77. See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 588 F.2d 31, 35-36 (2d Cir. 1978)
(grant of immunity refused on ground that defendant failed to make showing
both that he desired the witness' testimony and that witness would not testify
without immunity), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 917 (1979).
78. United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 776 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1077 (1981). The Turkish court recognized, however, that trial courts
can "accord use immunity" without usurping a function of the Executive
Branch. Id. Nevertheless, the Second Circuit held that the trial court must first
assess the implications that a judicial grant of immunity will have on the Executive Branch. Id.
79. 361 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 921 (1967). In Earl,
then judge Burger wrote, "What Appellant asks this Court to do is command the
Executive Branch of Government to exercise the statutory power of the Executive to grant immunity in order to secure relevant testimony. This power is inherent in the Executive and surely is not inherent in the judiciary." Id. at 534.
80. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 261 (1983) ("[n]o court
has the authority to immunize a witness" since that responsibility is peculiarly an
executive one); United States v. Lenz, 616 F.2d 960, 962 (6th Cir.) (courts have
no inherent power to grant immunity), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 929 (1980); United
States v. Allstate Mortgage Corp., 507 F.2d 492, 494-95 (7th Cir. 1974) ("While
the Congress may have the power to grant appellants a right comparable to the
right granted to the government, the judicial creation of such a right is beyond
the power of the courts."), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 999 (1975).
81. For a discussion of Simmons, see supra notes 65-75 and accompanying
text.
82. For a discussion of Kastigar, see supra notes 48-56 and accompanying
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Earl did not anticipate the rapid development of the
defendant's right to produce evidence in his own
defense-a development taking place almost entirely in the Burger Court with the Davis and Chambers decisions; 83 and
(4) The Earl reasoning did not anticipate the Supreme
Court's decision in Wardius v. Oregon,8 4 which held
that the due process clause requires reciprocity of
and
between prosecution
discovery rights
85
defense.
(3)

Irrespective of these four reasons for discarding Earl, the
separation of powers argument is erroneous because it ignores
the court's inherent power to guarantee a defendant's constitutional right. The Third Circuit recognized this in Government of
86
Virgin Islands v. Smith.
1.

The Smith Decision

After several feints in the direction of granting defense witness immunity in response to prosecutorial misconduct, 87 the
83. For a discussion of Davis and Chambers, see supra notes 18-36 and accompanying text.
84. 412 U.S. 470 (1973).
85. Id. at 475-76. In Wardius, the Court held that an Oregon alibi notice
statute was constitutionally infirm because the statute did not require the prosecution to reveal the identity of its rebuttal witnesses. Id. at 479 (citing OR. REV.
STAT. § 135.455 (1985) (formerly § 135.875). The Court reasoned that such a
statute skewed "the balance of forces between the accused and the accuser." Id.
at 474-75. The Court concluded that "[i]t is fundamentally unfair to require a
defendant to divulge the details of his own case while at the same time subjecting him to the hazard of surprise concerning refutation of the very pieces of
evidence which he disclosed to the state." Id. at 476. See also Ash v. United
States, 413 U.S. 300, 314 (1973) (because line-up resembles "a trial-like confrontation," counsel was needed to render assistance in counter balancing any
"overreaching by the prosecution"); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122
(1934) ("The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a
filament. We are to keep the balance true.").
86. 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980). For a further discussion of Smith, see infra
notes 88-106 and accompanying text.
87. See United States v. Hermann, 589 F.2d 1191, 1213 (3d Cir. 1978)
(courts have power to review United States Attorney's discretionary refusal to
grant defense witness immunity), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979); United States
v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1976) (due process requires that Government
grant defense witness use immunity when prosecutorial misconduct results in
defendant's principal witness refusing to give testimony because of fear of selfincrimination). See also United States v. DePalmer, 476 F. Supp. 775, 781
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (unfair to deny defense witness immunity where Government's
case was built on a "far-reaching immunity grant"), rev'd sub nom. United States
v. Horowitz, 622 F.2d 1101 (2d Cir. 1980) (remanded for trial court to determine if case was "one of those rare situations in which the government's refusal
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United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Smith,
squarely decided that a court has inherent power to grant a defense witness immunity in order to guarantee a defendant's due
process and sixth amendment rights to present evidence.8 8 The
Smith court was faced with a direct request for immunity by three
defendants charged with assault and robbery. Sanchez, the witness who the defendants sought to immunize, previously had
made a statement to the police in which he implicated himself as
one of the assailants along with a fourth defendant, while implicity exculpating the three defendants who were requesting immunity.8 9

When called as a defense witness, however, Sanchez

invoked the fifth amendment. The defense requested that the
prosecutor grant immunity to Sanchez, but the prosecutor refused, and the exculpatory evidence never was presented to the
jury. 90 On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed and remanded for
an evidentiary hearing to determine if Sanchez should be
immunized. 9 1
The court of appeals discussed the circumstances under
which a court could grant immunity without statutory
authorization:
Immunity granted in these circumstances differs from
the statutory immunity . . .in two respects. First, the

need for "judicial" immunity is triggered, not by
prosecutorial misconduct or intentional distortion of the
trial process, but by the fact that the defendant is prevented from presenting exculpatory evidence which is
crucial to his case. Second, the immunity granted is a
court decreed immunity; it is not achieved by any order directed to the executive, requiring the executive to pro92
vide statutory immunity.
to immunize a defendant's witnesses raises serious due process considerations"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1076 (1981).
88. 615 F.2d at 974.
89. Id. at 966-67.
90. Id. at 967. Sanchez was a minor, and was under the exclusive jurisdiction of juvenile authorities who consented to immunity subject to approval by
the United States Attorney. Id. The United States Attorney withheld his approval without explanation, and all four defendants consequently were convicted. Id.
91. Id. at 974.
92. Id. at 969-70 (emphasis in original). In addition to discussing the inherent power of a court to grant immunity, the court of appeals stated that statutory
immunity is available if the defendant shows "prosecutorial misconduct." Id. at
968.
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The court went on to explicate the theory underlying its ability to grant witness immunity. Relying on the groundwork laid in
its prosecutorial misconduct cases, 93 the court drew a favorable
comparison between Smith and Chambers v. Mississippi,94 observing
that "[i]n this case the primafacie due process violation revealed
by the record, i.e., the denial of exculpatory evidence to which
Sanchez could testify, is not different in substance than the violation found in Chambers." 9 5 The court also drew heavily on the
well settled principles of Roviaro v. United States,9 6 and Brady v.
Maryland,9 7 to find that "the essential task of a criminal trial is to
search for truth, and that [the] search is not furthered by rules
which turn the trial into a mere 'poker game' to be won by the
most skilled tactician." 9 8
The Smith court explained that it was not creating a new
right, but prescribing a new remedy-unique and affirmative in nature-to protect an established right. 99 Thus, the Third Circuit
found that the Constitution allowed, indeed required, the court to
create the remedy ofjudicial use immunity when there was cause
93. Id. at 968 (citing United States v. Hermann, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979)). The Third Circuit noted that it had
previously held that where prosecutorial misconduct toward a witness occurred
the court could acquit the defendant if the Government refused to obtain use
immunity so that the witness could testify. Id. (citing United States v. Morrison,
535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1976)). In Hermann, the Third Circuit expanded the Mornison holding and stated that "under certain circumstances due process may require that the government afford use immunity for a defense witness." Id. The
Hermann court recognized that a court can order the Government to grant statutory immunity where the defendant has shown that the Government's decision
not to provide immunity was a decision made "with the deliberate intention of
distorting the judicial factfinding process." Id.
94. For a discussion of Chambers, see supra notes 28-36 and accompanying
text.
95. 615 F.2d at 970. The Court commented that Sanchez's statement
tended to incriminate him while exculpating the three defendants, much like the
confession in Chambers. Id.
96. 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957) (under its supervisory power, federal court
can direct Government to produce prosecutor's informer or suffer dismissal of
prosecution if disclosure of identity is relevant and helpful to defense).
97. 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (finding violation of defendant's due process right
to present effective defense after Government suppressed the identity of actual
killer in murder prosecution where state was seeking death penalty for two
defendants).
98. 615 F.2d at 971.
99. Id. The court noted that the right involved-the right to present a defense-was the same right involved in Chambers and Brady. Id. However, the
court noted that it is unlikely that a new trial such as that provided in Brady and
Chambers would cure the constitutional defect. Id. This is because a retrial would
be meaningless unless the evidence necessary to present an effective defense
could be compelled. Id. In a case such as Smith, compulsion can only be
achieved by granting immunity to a defense witness. Id.
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to believe the defendant would be deprived of due process as a
result of the infringement of his core sixth amendment right.' 0 0
The court relied on Chambers to create the following safeguards to
guarantee that the new remedy is used only in appropriate cases:
(1)

An application must be made to the district court,
naming the witness and the details of his testimony;
(2) The witness must be available Lo testify;
(3) The defendant must make a sufficient showing to
satisfy the court that the forthcoming testimony is
clearly exculpatory;
(4) The defendant must show that the testimony is essential to the defendant's case; and
(5) There must be no strong countervailing governmental interest against a grant of immunity.' 0 '
Judge Garth, the author of the Smith decision, took great
pains to explain that use immunity-as contrasted with transactional immunity-could protect both the defendant and the Government, which has a weighty interest in prosecuting a
wrongdoing witness. 10 2 Judge Garth decreed that use immunity
was "virtually costless to the government,"' l0 3 reasoning that
under Kastigarthe witness still might be prosecuted from evidence
04
derived from sources independent of his testimony.
Smith represents the logical extension of Chambers, Davis, and
Washington, which require the court to admit exculpatory evidence. 10 5 Smith also is a logical extension of Simmons and Kastigar,
as it employs use immunity to accomplish the result required by
the due process clause and the sixth amendment. 0 6 What makes
Smith unique is the Third Circuit's willingness to fuse the reasoning of both lines of cases to grant the defendant both a substantive right and a procedural remedy. Smith involved only the fifth
100. Id. at 971-72.
101. Id. at 972. The court indicated that immunity will be denied if the
testimony is "ambiguous, not clearly exculpatory, cumulative or if it is found to
relate only to the credibility of the government's witnesses." Id.
102. Id. at 973 (citing Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972)).
103. Id.
104. Id. Judge Garth commented that the prosecution could assemble all
the evidence necessary to prosecute the witness prior to his testimony. Id. The
judge also suggested that the prosecution could "sterilize" the testimony of the
witness. Id.
105. For a discussion of Chambers, Davis, and Washington, see supra notes 936 and accompanying text.
106. For a discussion of Simmons and Kastigar, see supra notes 48-73 and
accompanying text.
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amendment right of a witness, however, and in one sense the decision did no more than place the defendant's rights on an equal
footing with the Government's rights acquired in Kastigar. But do
the due process clause and the sixth amendment require more?
May defendants reach the testimony of persons who possess exculpatory information, but whose testimony is protected by a
communication privilege? Recall our hypothetical. Smith would
enable the defendant to compel W in the hypothetical to testify in
the face of Ws fifth amendment right. Assume W refused to testify, however, and that he was held in contempt or died. Can the
Smith rationale be expanded to require Ws attorney, wife, and
psychiatrist to testify in the face of their claims of privilege?
Few federal courts have been inclined to follow the Third
Circuit's decision in Smith,' 0 7 and of that minority willing to consider judicially granting witness immunity, most courts have
found factual' 0 8 and evidentiary' 0 9 arguments for denying immu107. The majority of the circuits have declined to follow the Smith standard
and have denied use immunity to defense witnesses, generally on the ground of
separation of powers. See, e.g., United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 527-28
(6th Cir. 1984) (separation of powers doctrine denies federal courts power to
immunize defense witnesses), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 906 (1985); United States v.
Taylor, 728 F.2d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 1984) (use immunity is statutory creation
and "Congress was delegated the authority to grant use immunity solely to the
executive branch of government"); Autry v. Estelle, 706 F.2d 1394, 1401 (5th
Cir. 1983) (rejecting judicial immunization, in absence of governmental abuse,
as not being "a task congenial to the judicial function"); United States v. Frans,
697 F.2d 188, 191 (7th Cir.) (Congress has conferred power to seek use immunity exclusively upon executive branch), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 828 (1983); United
States v. Heffington, 682 F.2d 1075, 1081 (5th Cir. 1982) (declines to follow
minority Third Circuit view as serious intrusion into realm of executive branch),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1108 (1983); United States v. Hunter, 672 F.2d 815, 818
(10th Cir. 1982) (rejecting Smith standard; holding that "courts have no power
to independently fashion witness use immunity under the guise of due process"); United States v. D'Apice, 664 F.2d 75, 77 (5th Cir. 1981) (court has no
independent authority to bestow use immunity on defense witnesses in absense
of claim that refusal to grant immunity would violate rights to fair trial and compulsory attendance); United States v. Herbst, 641 F.2d 1161, 1168 (5th Cir.)
(declining to follow Smith because it is minority view and trial record failed to
show any constitutional violation), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 851 (1981); United States
v. Kember, 648 F.2d 1354, 1371 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (grants of immunity are made
largely at discretion of executive and legislative branches); Grochulski v. Henderson, 637 F.2d 50, 52 (2d Cir. 1980) (circumstances where prosecutor might
be obligated to grant use immunity are "extremely narrow"), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 927 (1981); United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 771-79 (2d Cir. 1980)
(explicitly rejecting Smith and refusing to find requirement in due process clause
that courts must order defense witness immunity), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077
(1981); United States v. McMichael, 492 F. Supp. 205 (D. Colo. 1980) (power to
grant immunity is strictly limited to executive branch).
108. While both the Third and Ninth Circuits follow the Smith standard for

immunization of defense witnesses, immunity has been refused in most cases in
these circuits because the request has been unsupported by facts sufficient to
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nity. An increasing number of state courts, however, have allowed defendants to compel testimony to support their defense in
spite of the fifth amendment or other witness privileges or privacy
interests. 1 10 The witness' status and the potential for granting
him use immunity rarely are discussed because in most instances
the witness or privilege-holder simply does not request immunity.
May Chambers be extended not only to compel testimony from a
witness who might have committed the crime but from another in
whom the witness has confided? While neither Washington, nor
Chambers, nor Smith compel such a result, when read in conjunction with Davis v. Alaska these cases suggest a comprehensive defense right to reach not only the witness but the information
meet Smith's "clearly exculpatory" and "essential evidence" requirements. See
United States v. Brutzman, 731 F.2d 1449, 1452 (9th Cir. 1984) (refusal to order
prosecutor to immunize defense witness was not error where testimony sought
was cumulative or not exculpatory); United States v. Bazzano, 712 F.2d 826, 840
(3d Cir. 1983) (immunity denied where defendant failed both to identify proposed defense witnesses and to specify exculpatory nature of their testimony),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1070 (1984); United States v. Steele, 685 F.2d 793, 808 (3d
Cir.) (proferred testimony ambiguous and not clearly exculpatory as required by
Smith), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 908 (1982). But see United States v. Lord, 711 F.2d
887, 891-92 (9th Cir. 1983) (no absolute right to immunity, but prosecutorial
misconduct that causes defense witness to refuse to testify warrants acquittal if
prosecutor refuses to grant subsequent immunity).
109. See United States v. Carducci, 557 F. Supp. 531, 534-35 (W.D. Pa.
1983) (refusing to extend Smith to immunize defendant's own testimony at retrial where government has legitimate interest in preserving its ability to prosecute defendant for perjury); United States v. Nolan, 523 F. Supp. 1235, 1240
(W.D. Pa. 1981) (generality of defendant's statement of proferred testimony
failed to meet Smith requirements); United States v. Lowell, 490 F. Supp. 897,
905 (D.N.J. 1980) (defense witness immunity refused where proferred testimony
was not "clearly exculpatory" and where government had legitimate interest
against granting immunity), afd, 649 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v.
Stout, 499 F. Supp. 605, 606-07 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (proferred testimony failed to
meet "clearly exculpatory and essential evidence" requirements of Smith because
statements were conclusory); United States v. Shober, 489 F. Supp. 412, 415-16
(E.D. Pa. 1980) (although courts may confer immunity on defense witness prior
to close of Government's case, court was unable to determine at time of defendant's motion whether proferred testimony was "clearly exculpatory"). Other circuits have refrained from expressly rejecting Smith or articulating any opinion
regarding the power of the courts independently to grant immunity to defense
witnesses. While ostestibly applying the Smith standards, most of these cases
have lacked facts sufficient to justify granting of the Smith remedy. See United
States v. Flaherty, 668 F.2d 566, 583 n.* (1st Cir. 1981) (although leaving open
question whether due process ever requires immunization of defense witnesses,
court found defendant's proferred testimony not clearly exculpatory); United
States v. Davis, 623 F.2d 188, 192-93 (1st Cir. 1980) (testimony of defense witness went to credibility of Government witness and was not clearly exculpatory).
110. For citations to state court decisions allowing defendants to compel a
witness' testimony over the witness' legitimate claims of privilege, see supra note
27 & infra note 142.
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itself,II
The separation of powers argument misconstrues the source
of witness immunity. As Judge Garth explained in Smith, the immunity flows from the court's interpretation of the Constitutionnot from any statute." 12 In Simmons, the Supreme Court was not
substituting its view for that of the executive; it was employing its
constitutional power to enforce a defendant's fourth and fifth
amendment rights.' 13 Moreover, in Roviaro v. United States" 14 the
Court arguably exercised an executive function when it ordered
the Government either to supply the identity of an eyewitnessinformer or to dismiss the indictment."l 5 No one seriously questioned the Court's supervisory power to exact this form of relief.
Finally, the courts have just as much, or more, interest in reliable
and effective fact finding as does the Executive Branch of the
Government." 6 It also is patently ridiculous to argue that the
separation of powers doctrine prevents judicial intervention to
preserve and protect constitutional rights."l 7 One would have
thought that the Court's entrance into the political thicket of reapportionment," 8 the legislative thicket of determining congres111. See Westen, Compulsory Process Clause, supra note 8, at 166-170. For a
discussion of Davis, see supra notes 18-27 and accompanying text.
112. See Smith, 615 F.2d at 969-70. The Smith court indicated that judicial
imunity is "triggered ... by the fact that the defendant is prevented from
presenting exculpatory evidence which is crucial to his case." Id. at 969.
113. For a discussion of Simmons, see supra notes 65-70 and accompanying
text.
114. 353 U.S. 53 (1957). In Roviaro, the prosecution refused to reveal the
identity of "John Doe," who had a material role in the case against the defendant. Id. at 55.
115. Id. at 65 & n.15.
116. See id. at 60-61. See also Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 48990 (1976) (acknowledging continuing vitality of Court's power to supervise due
process violations of protected rights); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,
431-32 (1973) (conduct of law enforcement may be so outrageous that due process would bar use by government ofjudiciary to obtain convictions); Smith, 615
F.2d at 971-74. See also Westen, Dilemmas, supra note 8, at 766-67.
117. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 707-09 ("primary constitutional
duty of the judicial Branch [is] to do justice in criminal prosecutions"). See also
Westen, Dilemmas, supra note 8, at 765 ("the constitutional issue of testimonial
immunity bears as heavily on the integrity and efficacy of the judicial branch as
on the executive branch").
118. Compare Colegrove v. Greene, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) (it is beyond
Court's competence to declare invalid Illinois law governing congressional districts) with Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (cause of action for fair apportionment is justiciable issue under equal protection clause). See also United States v.
Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944) (conspiracy to stuff ballot box violates right to have
vote honestly counted); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941) (right to
vote in primary election is guaranteed by Constitution); United States v. Mosley,
238 U.S. 383 (1915) (conspiracy to prevent official ballot count in congressional
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sional membership credentials, 1 9 or the educational thickets of
busing 20 and separate but equal facilities' 2 ' would have laid this
specious reasoning to rest. It is obvious that a criminal trial conducted without the benefit of testimony by a witness who has admitted committing the crime is less reliable, and, thus, less fair
than a trial in which such a witness has testified. All of the
prosecutorial naysaying and rationalization cannot change that
fact. Courts should come to their senses and remove the hypo12 2
critically imposed barriers that deny defendants a fair trial.
B.

The Prosecution'sInterests-The Danger of Fabrication

Recall that the Third Circuit reassured in Smith that the
granting of use immunity is "virtually costless to the government." 2 3 As noted above, the court reasoned that the Government's ability to prosecute the witness is not impaired by a
conferral of use immunity.' 24 The Smith court recognized, however, that the Government does have a legitimate interest in
preventing a guilty defendant from escaping conviction by virtue
of contrived or fabricated testimony, but the court found this concern to be inapplicable to the facts before it in Smith.' 25
In Chambers, the State of Mississippi suggested a hypothetical
situation in which a witness (W) would make a declaration against
election infringes on constitutional rights); accord Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371
(1879).
119. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (Congress cannot refuse to seat duly elected member who has met standing requirements set forth in
Constitution).
120. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
121. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) ("the very essence of civil
liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection
of the laws, whenever he receives an injury").
122. See e.g., FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) (allowing admission of declaration
against penal interest in civil case without corroboration but requiring corroboration in criminal case when it is used to exculpate defendant). See also United
States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 584 (1971) (allowing uncorroborated statements
that were against declarant's penal interest as basis for meeting probable cause

for search warrant); J.

MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW

133 (1947) (questioning whether dying declarations should be admitted over
hearsay objection).
123. 615 F.2d at 1973.
124. Id. If the Government wishes to delay prosecuting a defendant in order to investigate the witness granted use immunity, it can easily obtain a continuance. See id. If such options are available to the prosecutor, the court
concluded that there are no governmental interests that outweigh defendant's
due process rights. Id.
125. Id. at 973-74.
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penal interest and then flee the jurisdiction. Thereafter the defendant (D), could introduce the declaration at his trial and gain
an acquittal. Upon Ws subsequent prosecution for murder, D
would testify that he, and not W, committed the murder, and W
also would gain an acquittal. Moreover, neither W nor D could be
prosecuted for perjury since W never testified, and D told the
truth. 2 6 The Chambers Court refused to consider the state's hypothetical because the witness, McDonald, was present and available
for cross-examination, 12 7 and because his statements were cor28
roborated by other evidence.1
One can conjure up similar scenarios to argue against witness
immunity, including a witness hiring a lawyer, inaccurately advising the lawyer that he committed the crime, and then fleeing the
jurisdiction. Such scenarios, however, should not dissuade courts
from accepting use immunity as a means to resolve the conflict
created when a communication privilege prevents a witness from
providing evidence that might exculpate a defendant. To be sure,
such scenarios rarely will occur. Assuming they do, however, the
mere fact that the device of use immunity of defense witnesses
might be abused is insufficient to overcome a defendant's constitutional rights. 1 29 In addition, while it might be true that Wis not
guilty of perjury, if he intends to subvert justice in D's trial, he
clearly is guilty of obstruction of justice.13 0 Moreover, the prosecution, juries, and the courts are fully capable of distinguishing a
spurious defense from a legitimate one.
The state is fully able to cross-examine a witness and investi126. See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 301 n.21.

127. Id.
128. Id. at 300. The independent corroboration included a sworn confession, eyewitness testimony, proof of prior ownership of a gun, and a number of
independent confessions. Id.
129. Cf Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 612 (1972) (invalidating state
law requiring defendant to testify prior to presenting any other witnesses);
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 21-23 (1967) (possibility that accomplice
would perjure himself held to be too remote and general to justify statutory bar
against his testimony).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has refused to follow Smith because of the
problem of fabrication. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 507 Pa. 27, 487 A.2d
1320 (1985). In a poorly reasoned opinion that ignored the reasoning of Smith
the court held that the dangers of fabrication were too great to permit a defendant to use the remedy of use immunity. Id. at 37, 487 A.2d at 1325. The Court
also ignored its own decision in Commonwealth v. Negri, which held that it was
bound to accept and follow a decision of the Third Circuit as the "ultimate forum in Pennsylvania." Id. at 35-36, 487 A.2d at 1324. See Commonwealth v.
Negri, 419 Pa. 117, 213 A.2d 670 (1965).

130. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (1982).
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gate the truth of his testimony, and juries are expected to evaluate
and understand many types of harmful evidence and to place it in
perspective, 13 1 especially with the aid of the court's instructions. 13 2 In fact, the Wigmorean reliance on the effectiveness of
cross-examination 3 3 and instructions, which has influenced the
erosion of rigid and archaic competency rules, should apply here
with equal force.
The courts too are equipped to evaluate and weigh the reliability and genuineness of such evidence. When there exists a real
concern about the reliability of evidence, a court can hold an in
limine hearing to weigh all of the factors surrounding the admission of Ws declaration. Courts considering the reliability of an
unavailable witness' out-of-court statements against penal interest
made in a privileged context would look for corroboration of the
details of the statement. Corroborating factors would include the
following:
(1)

Other evidence connecting W to the crime or crime
34
scene. 1

(2)
(3)

Other out-of-court statements made in non-privileged contexts. 135
The circumstances of the statement in the privileged context, e.g., was it made near the time of the

131. See, e.g., Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88-89, 90-93 (1970) (fourJustices who reviewed statement made by coconspirator in prison after the conspirators were arrested and about to stand trial were satisfied that it was properly
admitted under coconspirator exception to hearsay rule and as spontaneous utterance; three Justices viewed admission as harmless error).
132. See Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622, 629-30 (1971) (where court gives
limiting instruction, admission of coconspirator's out-of-court statement implicating defendant did not violate defendant's rights because declarant testified in
favor of defendant at trial). But see Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 137
(1968) (admission of coconspirator's out-of-court confession in joint trial violated defendant's right to cross-examine despite judge's limiting instructions).
133. See 5J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367, at 32 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974)
("[Cross-examination] is beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.").
134. See, e.g., Chambers, 410 U.S. at 300-01. Other doctrines require the
prosecution to meet a certain evidentiary standard before certain out-of-court
statements are deemed admissible. See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S.
440, 443-45 (1949) (out-of-court coconspirator statements must be made in furtherance of the charged conspiracy); Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 89-90
(1954) (extra-judicial admission of guilt by defendant after he has been charged
must be corroborated); Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 154-55 (1954) (requirement of corroboration of out-of-court admissions is applicable to tax evasion case where admission embraces vital element of Government's case). See
also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 489-90 (1963) (conspirator's unsigned confession is not competent corroborative evidence).
135. See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 300-01.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol30/iss6/7

30

Natali: Does a Criminal Defendant Have a Constitutional Right to Compel t

1985]

DEFENDANT'S

RIGHT TO COMPEL

1531

event or near the time of the trial. t3 6
(4) The reason why W consulted a lawyer (in the case
37
involving an attorney-client privilege).'
(5) The reason for W's absence from the trial court's
38
jurisidiction.'
In the absence of specific factual findings demonstrating a lack of
reliability, the declarations made in confidence should be
admitted.
Finally, the very reason why such statements are reliable in
the first place seems to mandate their admission into evidence.
People simply do not go around admitting to crimes that they did
not commit.' 3

9

In Chambers, the Court pointed to the assurances

of reliability surrounding a statement that is in essence an admission of guilt.'

40

The same assurances would apply even if the wit-

ness-client was unavailable for cross-examination because of
flight, death, lack of memory, or a contemptuous refusal to
4
testify.' '

C.

The Interest of the Privilege-Holder-TheNeed to Balance

As previously noted, the cases compelling the revelation of a
confidential communication 4 2 do not always articulate the Smith
136. See id. at 300. In Chambers, McDonald's confessions were made spontaneously shortly after the murder. Id.
137. For instance, was W about to be arrested, indicted, or subpoened to a
grand jury; or, on the other hand, was Ws consultation with a lawyer and his
attendant admission gratuitous?
138. For example, was it because of flight or some other immaterial or unrelated reason? Cf Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972).
139. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) advisory committee note.
140. 410 U.S. at 300-01.
141. See id. Although McDonald was available for cross-examination in
Chambers, none actually occurred due to operation of the voucher rule in that
case. Id. at 291-92. It was the high degree of corroboration that convinced the
Court of the reliability of McDonald's out-of-court declaration against interest.
Id. at 300-01. For a further discussion of Chambers, see supra notes 28-36 and
accompanying text.
142. For citations to cases compelling the revelation of confidential communications, see supra note 27. But see Durr v. Cook, 589 F.2d 891, 893 (5th Cir.
1979) (due process right to fair trial can overcome juror privilege upon sufficient
showing of possibility of prejudice); Hammarlay v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App.
3d 388, 153 Cal. Rptr. 608 (1979) (newsman's statutory privilege must be compromised to guarantee defendant's due process and compulsory process rights);
In re Kozlov, 79 N.J. 232, 398 A.2d 882 (1979) (attorney-client privilege is no bar
to defendant's right to produce evidence of juror misconduct if such evidence
cannot be obtained from less intrusive source); In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394
A.2d 330 (neither first amendment nor newsman's statutory privilege protects
reporter from production of relevant notes for impeachment use by defendant
in criminal trial if notes were material and could not be obtained in less intrusive
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rationale. Nor do such cases address the needs of the privilege
holder subsequent to his or her disclosure. Thus, there is a need
for a method that provides protection to both the defendant and
the privilege-holder. The reasoning of Simmons, Kastigar, and
Chambers must be followed to its logical conclusion. While at least
one commentator has glibly dismissed the interest of the witness
and privilege-holder, 43 it seems quite obvious that there is potential for a disruption of the relationships that the communication privileges are designed to protect if a court has the
constitutional power to compel any witness' testimony. It certainly would be disturbing for counsel to be faced with the prospect of advising a client that the attorney-client privilege might
not relieve either client or attorney from the duty to testify in order to exculpate a criminal defendant. 44 The creation of such a
duty would similarly create a significant danger that one of the
major purposes of the attorney-client privilege may be defeated.
If a client faces the possibility that his counsel might be compelled to disclose the client's confidence, the risk exists that the
client might make incomplete or inaccurate disclosures to his atway), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978); Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Co., 238 Pa.
Super. 456, 357 A.2d 689 (1976) (interests ofjustice require disclosure of communications to attorney).
143. See Westen, Dilemmas, supra note 8, at 770 (witnesses are indifferent as
to responding by silence or testifying under a grant of immunity). See also Keshishian v. State, 386 A.2d 666 (Del. 1978) (right of compulsory process overrides
witness' interest in avoiding emotional harm).
144. Letter from Benjamin Lerner, President, National Legal Aid and Defender Association, to Professor Louis Natali, Jr. (Feb. 12, 1985). The letter
provides:
Dear Professor Natali:
On behalf of the National Legal Aid and Defender Association I
want to respond to your interesting proposal of providing use immunity for defense witnesses, including the immunization of privileged
conversations. I am opposed to such a proposals on two grounds.
First, the ability to compel disclosure of client-attorney conversations
and files would seriously chill the Constitutional rights of individuals.
Too often our constituency is unable to obtain counsel for consultations. Your proposal would make it even more difficult for our member
agencies to perform their role. Secondly, clients' distrust of appointed
attorneys often creates real barriers to communication. If it became
widely known that a court-appointed attorney could be compelled to
reveal client confidences there would be an even greater breakdown of
client confidence. While I think your proposal would occasionally assist
a defendant at trial in producing exculpatory testimony, the damage to
the overall attorney-client relationship would be of greater significance.
I can, however, support the obligation of a court to grant use immunity
to the witness who stands behind his fifth amendment privilege. I hope
that these comments are of assistance to you.
Benjamin Lerner
President
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torney. Such a risk, in turn, would create the further risk that
counsel would be unable to perform effectively. Similarly, if a
spouse can be compelled to disclose the substance of communications revealed by his or her mate, their marital relationship might
be endangered. The same reasoning applies to support the doctor-patient, priest-penitent, and other communication privileges.
In order to understand how use immunity can be used to protect
the relationships underlying the various communication privileges, it is necessary to examine fully the theoretical basis for use
immunity as it applies to the privilege-holder, and to clarify a
number of tangential issues in the event of a subsequent prosecution of a witness.
While privileges generally have withstood the scholarly on6
slaught waged against them in law reviews, 14 5 monographs, 4
and the popular media, 147 there has been a growing middle
ground of accommodation. This view does not treat the privileges as blanket per se rules of exclusion, but rather as attempts
to engage in an ad hoc balancing test. The goals of the balancing
test are twofold: first, to determine ..he purpose of the privilege,
and second, to ask how that purpose will be served vis a vis the
larger needs of society.' 48 The balancing test accepts the risk of
exclusion of truthful evidence when the purpose to be served by
the privilege is greater than the benefit attained by invading the
privilege. At the same time, however, the balancing test requires
the relaxation of a privilege if the potential harm that will occur
therefrom can be avoided or is outweighed by the harm which will
result from excluding truthful evidence.
The United States Supreme Court took just such a pragmatic
approach in limiting the ancient rule of spousal incompetency in
Trammel v. United States, 149 where the Court permitted a wife to
testify as to the nonconfidential acts and statements of her husband concerning a conspiracy to import drugs into the United
States.' 50 The Trammel Court observed that the privilege of one
145. See, e.g., Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Fixed Rules, Balancing, and
Constitutional Entitlement, 91 HARV. L. REV. 464 (1977).
146. See, e.g., 5 J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 300-50

(1827).
147. See, e.g., Gest, Guilty Secrets are Still Safe with Lawyers, U.S.
WORLD REP., Feb. 2, 1983, at 84.

NEWS

&

148. See Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Co., 238 Pa. Super. 456, 462, 357 A.2d
689, 692 (1976) (attorney-client privilege is no bar to disclosure where client's
rights cannot be adversely effected and where disclosure is in interest ofjustice).
149. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
150. Id. at 53. Defendant's wife had been granted use immunity by the
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spouse to silence another from testifying as to nonconfidential
statements had outlived both its theoretical foundation and its
usefulness.' 5 ' The Court held that pursuant to its interpretation of
rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 5 2 only the witnessspouse, and not the defendant-spouse, possesses the privilege to
refuse to give adverse testimony.' 5 3 The Court reasoned that if
the marriage continued to provide a significant basis for remaining silent, the witness-spouse was in as good a position as the defendant to so determine. The Court stated, "In these
circumstances, a rule of evidence that permits an accused to prevent adverse spousal testimony seems far more likely to frustrate
154
justice than to foster family peace."'
Trammel represents simply another balancing of the purpose
of the privilege against the harm to be done by revelation or
nonrevelation.' 55 Trammel's reasoning and language are equally
applicable to our hypothetical, in which, if use immunity is
granted, the testimony would be used not to incriminate the privilege-holder but to exculpate an innocent defendant.' 56 In fact,
the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Co.
held that the attorney-client privilege does not bar revelation of
disclosures made to the attorney "where, in context, the client's
rights or interests cannot be adversely affected thereby."' 5 7 The
Government after she agreed to cooperate with the Government. Id. at 42-43.
The district court ruled that defendant's wife could not testify as to confidential
communications with her husband. Id. at 43.
151. Id. at 51-53. The Court stated the exclusionary rules accepted "only
to the very limited extent [the notion] that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth." Id. at 50
(quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting)).
152. FED. R. EvID. 501. Rule 501 provides that privileges "shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the court
of the United States in the light of reason and experience." Id. (emphasis added).
153. 445 U.S. at 53. The Court concluded that its modification permitted
continued adherance to the underlying purpose of the husband-wife privilegemarital harmony-"without unduly burdening legitimate law enforcement
needs." Id.
154. Id. at 52.
155. Id. at 52-53. See Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332 (1951) (upholding
defendant's right not to reveal wife's location in grand jury hearing because it
was protected as confidential communication); Wolfe v. United States, 291 U.S.
7 (1934) (marital privilege only permitted when there is no other reasonable way
to preserve marital confidence).
156. See supra text preceding note 47.
157. 238 Pa. Super. 456, 462, 357 A.2d 689, 692 (1976) (emphasis added).
The Cohen court focused on the following factors: the client was dead; he was
not a party to the action; the privileged conversation was not scandalous to the

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol30/iss6/7

34

Natali: Does a Criminal Defendant Have a Constitutional Right to Compel t

1985]

DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO COMPEL

1535

"context" was a personal injury action against the client's former
employer, where the client was dead and had no estate. Prior to
his death, the client informed his attorney that he had hit the
plaintiff and fled the scene of the accident. The client also had
given false testimony at an arbitration hearing. 158 The Cohen
court found "there is now no possibility that [the client] or his
heirs could realize any liability over to the cab company as a result
of disclosure of his conversation with [his attorney]; and, of
course, the death of [the client] precludes the possibility of his
being prosecuted for perjury or false swearing."' 159 Noting that
there were no other eyewitnesses to the accident, the court balanced the necessity for revealing the substance of the privileged
conversation against "the unlikelihood of any cognizable injury to
the rights, interests, estate or memory" of the client and concluded that "the privilege must fail." 160 The privilege, the court
noted, "exists only to aid in the administration of justice, and
when it is shown that the interests of the administration of justice
can only be frustrated by the exercise of the privilege, the trial
judge may require that the communication be disclosed."' 16 The
essence of the court's reasoning is that the privilege only protects
the client when he either is on trial or could be prosecuted as a
result of the revelation of his confidence.
Such a balancing approach should be available equally to
both the Government and a defendant. Once a defendant makes
the showing required by Smith, the court is in an informed position to balance the competing interests of the defendant and the
privilege-holders.
IV.

EVALUATION OF THE RISK OF INVASION OF PRIVACY TO THE
PRIVILEGED RATIONSHIP

While it is certain that justice will be frustrated by allowing
invocation of a communication privilege where doing so will deprive a defendant of his constitutional rights, is it equally certain
client; and there was a strong need for the testimony. Id. at 462-64, 357 A.2d at

692-93.
158. Id. at 458-59, 357 A.2d at 690-91.
159. Id. at 464, 357 A.2d at 693.
160. Id. at 463-64, 357 A.2d at 693. The court found nothing "impertinent
or scandalous" in the admission of the evidence, even though it proved the client's perjury for which the statute of limitations had passed. Id. at 463, 357 A.2d

at 693.
161. Id. at 464, 357 A.2d at 693-94. The attorney had revealed the client's
statements in a deposition in which the parties agreed to reserve all objections
until trial. Id. at 458-59, 357 A.2d at 691.
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that the relationship underlying a privilege will not be damaged if
use immunity is granted to its holder? The attorney, wife, and
psychiatrist might be able to exonerate the defendant, but will
their testimony be used against the holder of the privilege in any
subsequent prosecution?
Conferring use immunity on family and professional revelations raises other problems. Since use immunity would not protect the witness from all prosecution or public disclosure of
deleterious information, it seems necessary to ask whether more
is required to protect the confidential relationships and the communications flowing from these relationships. While Kastigarfurnishes the theory for use imunity,16 2 it must be understood that
the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination necessarily
involves different rights and concerns than do the communication
privileges. A witness' invocation of his fifth amendment rights ordinarily does not involve any confidential relationship or communication. Indeed, the compulsion to testify goes directly to the
witness and involves his acts rather than his revelations to someone else which would trigger a communication privilege. Moreover, neither Kastigar nor the general right of the Government to
every man's testimony has been extended to justify the Govern63
ment's invasion of the confidential communication privileges.'
Although Trammel does permit limited invasion of the privilege
against adverse spousal testimony providing that the testifying
spouse is willing to aid the Government, confidential communications still are protected.
The communication privileges spring from a complex array
of relationships that, while not necessarily protected by the Constitution, are deeply rooted in basic notions of privacy. These
interests are variously viewed as sacred, 16 4 fundamental, 165 or
constitutional. '

66

162. For a discussion of Kastigar, see supra notes 48-56 and accompanying
text.
163. See, e.g., Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332-34 (1951) (Government is
not able to compel revelation of information protected by marital communication privileges).
164. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (the essence of
claimed constitutional offence "is the invasion of his indefeasible right to personal security, personal liberty and private property ....

of this sacred right");

Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 209, 223 (1839) (marital communication
privilege is necessary to "protect the sanctities of husband and wife").
165. See Note, supra note 145, at 464-74. See also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374, 383-84 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
166. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (right to marry is
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The following sections of this article examine the dangers to
these interests in detail. The dangers from revelation appear to
be (1) the danger of subsequent prosecution; (2) the danger of
social stigma or obloquy; and (3) the chilling effect on communications and erosion of underlying relationships.
A. Danger of Prosecution
What happens after the immunized witness, his lawyer, or his
wife testifies, and reveals the privilege-holder's participation in a
crime? Certainly the prosecutor will engage in some inquiry.
While in many cases, as in Smith, the prosecution will be aware of
the privilege-holder's involvement prior to the testimony, there is
also a class of cases where the prosecution may know nothing or
very little about the privilege-holder prior to the testimony. Use
immunity does not and can not prevent the prosecution from investigating the privilege-holder. Use immunity does, however,
protect the privilege-holder against the direct or indirect testimonial in-court use of the immunized testimony. Moreover, recall
that under Kastigar, in order to provide complete protection, the
burden of proof will be on the prosecution to establish an independent source for any subsequent prosecution and for any
67
supporting evidence utilized therein.
In the relatively rare case where the privilege-holder is unknown to the prosecution, there are additional protections that
the court can impose. For example, the court can conduct an ex
parte in camera hearing, thereby preventing the prosecution from
learning the privilege-holder's identity.i68 But should the privilege-holder receive any greater protection simply because he previously was unknown to the prosecution? The only other possible
protection is transaction immunity. This is too far-reaching a
remedy, however, and outstrips any possible theoretical justification for it. The privilege-holder, though unknown to the prosecution, is known to the defense, which is free to advocate that the
Government investigate by any legal method-including grand
jury subpoena. If the prosecutor, following such a lead, chooses
to immunize the privilege-holder for grand jury purposes, then
the Government can satisfy its burden of showing an independent
part of "right of privacy" implicit in fourteenth amendment's due process
clause).
167. 406 U.S. at 460. The Kastigar Court indicates that this protection was
"commensurate with that resulting from invoking the privilege itself." Id. at
461.
168. See Nixon v. United States, 418 U.S. 708, 714-16 (1974).
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source and the privilege-holder has no enforceable right whatso69
ever. Certainly a defendant who meets the stringent Smith test
ought to be able to persuade the Government to undertake at
least some minimal investigation. Since this is possible in every
case, judicially created use immunity to enforce a defendant's
rights poses no greater prosecutional threat to a privilege-holder.
In addition, it should be noted that no constitutional provision, statute, or common law development confers upon an individual a right to suppress evidence obtained from out-of-court
revelations made by a spouse, attorney, or other person in a relationship giving rise to a communication privilege.170 The Trammel
Court recognized that such a right does not exist when it held that
neither its earlier decision in Hawkins v. United States,' 7 1 which reaffirmed the rule excluding adverse spousal testimony, nor any
other decision, barred the Government from seeking incriminating information from one spouse to use against the other. 7 2 The
Court reasoned that neither Hawkins, nor any other privilege, prevents the Government from enlisting one spouse to give information concerning the other or to aid in the other's apprehension.
It is only the use of a spouse's testimony in the courtroom that is
prohibited.173
The only real distinction is that while we readily recognize
the Government's right to compel an immunized witness to incriminate himself, we only grudgingly accept the defendant's
right to do so. If justice is to be served, parties must be on an
equal footing. 174 The principle that the Government is entitled to
169. For a discussion of the Smith test, see supra note 101 and accompanying text.
170. See, e.g., United States v. Lefkowitz, 618 F.2d 1313 (9th Cir.) (wife's
information was the basis for affidavit supporting search warrant), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 824 (1980). See generally Note, Confidential Relationships: Does the Law
Require Silence Outside the Courtroom?, 6 UTAH L. REV. 380 (1959).
171. 358 U.S. 74 (1958) (overruled by Trammel, 445 U.S. 40). In Hawkins,
the Court refused to permit a wife to voluntarily testify against her husband on
the ground that permitting such testimony would destroy most marriages. 358
U.S. at 77-79. The Hawkins Court refused to accept the truth of the prosecutor's
contention that if the wife was willing to testify, the marriage already was in
trouble. Id. at 77-78.
172. 445 U.S. at 52-53.
173. Id. at 52 n.12.
174. See, e.g., Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 (1972) (due process
requires balance of forces between accused and accuser).
It is suggested that if the Government is required to inform the defense of
the identity of its alibi and rebuttal witnesses after a court imposes an alibi notice
requirement on the defense, the Government should not be permitted to immunize witnesses while denying such a right to the defense. See Smith, 615 F.2d at
972-73. See also Note, Every Man's Evidence, supra note 8, at 1232-33.
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every man's evidence should apply equally to ensure that the defendant attains every man's evidence.
B.

Danger of Social Stigma, Obloquy, or Ostracism

Assuming that a witness is adequately protected from prosecution by virtue of use immunity, we must ask whether a witness
who possesses information protected by a communication privilege should be permitted to withhold that information on the
ground that disclosure of the contents of the privileged communication might subject the privilege-holder, and possibly his family,
to public obloquy and social ostracism. The answer to this question should be a resounding "No"! In the first place, such an adverse consequence of invading the communication privileges
arguably is irrelevant, because the protection of the communication privileges should extend no further than that of the fifth
amendment. Second, even if the protection of the communication privileges does extend beyond that of the fifth amendment,
the courts are adequately equipped to protect even against harm
to such interests as the privilege-holder's reputation. Finally, in
the rare case where a privilege-holder's reputation is harmed as a
result of the court's invasion of a communication privilege, such
harm clearly is outweighed by the harm which otherwise would
result from permitting the communication privilege to defeat the
defendant's constitutional rights to a fair trial and to present evidence on his own behalf. The following three subsections of this
article present a more detailed elaboration of these three arguments against permitting the defendant's constitutional rights to
be defeated in order that the reputation of the holder of a communication privilege be preserved.
1. The Protection of the Communication Privileges Does Not Extend to
the Privilege-Holder'sReputation
Do the communication pivileges exist solely to protect their
holders from potential prosecution, or do they exist to protect
their holders from public revelation of their misdeeds, crimes, juvenile records, mental and sexual backgrounds, and other information that might tend to cause members of the privilegeholder's community to hold him in lower esteem? More succinctly stated: Do the communication privileges protect the privilege-holder's privacy interests as well as providing protection
against criminal prosecution? The answer to this question can be
found by examining the history of the privileges.
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The communication privileges developed in Elizabethan
England as absolute bars against the revelation of confidential
communications. 7 5 Initially, the communication privilege applied only to lawyers; later, by judicial or legislative extension, the
privilege was applied to other relationships and professions. 176
The raison d'etre for the privileges has changed, however, as
the nature of society has changed. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the theoretical foundation of the attorney-client
privilege evolved from one of "oath and honor" to one of "servant." 7 7 The nineteenth century saw the development of an instrumentalist rationale, which focused on the necessity of insuring
full disclosure so that the client could receive proper legal advice.178 More recently, civil libertarians have asserted that the attorney-client privilege flows from the fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination and the sixth amendment right to
79
counsel. 1
In Ullman v. United States, 180 the Supreme Court of the United
States held that the fifth amendment does not protect an immunized witness from "loss of job, expulsion from labor unions,
state registration and investigation statutes, passport eligibility
and general public opprobrium."' 8's Rejecting the claim of privilege in Ullman, the Court held that the "sole concern" underlying
the privilege is "as its name indicates, with the danger to a witness
175. The term "privilege" derives from an amalgram of the Latin "privata
lex" or "private law." See Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411, 413 (Alaska 1976); Berd
v. Lovelace, Cary 21 Eng. Rep. 33 (Ch. 1577); Slovenko, Psychiatry and a Second
Look at the Medical Privilege, 6 WAYNE L. REV. 175, 181 (1960) (phrase "privata
lex" means prerogative given to person or class of persons). Thus, privilege
originally was a private law applicable only to a specific group or profession. See
8 J. WIGMORE EVIDENCE § 2290, at 542-45 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
176. See 8J. WIGMORE, supra note 175, § 2286, at 528-37.
177. Id. § 2290, at 543.
178. See Note, supra note 145, at 465-66.
179. Id. at 485. Without the attorney-client privilege, a client would have to
waive his right against self-incrimination to enjoy his right to counsel and vice
versa. Id. at 485-86. See Keker v. Procunier, 398 F. Supp. 756, 764-66 (E.D. Cal.
1975) (prison practice requiring prisoner who desires to meet with attorney to
do so in room separated by glass, via telephone, and under continual guard,
violates sixth amendment rights). But cf. United States v. Liddy, 509 F.2d 428,
442-43 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (fact that client consulted lawyer after Watergate breakin is not privileged), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 911 (1975).
180. 350 U.S. 422 (1956). In Ullman, petitioner refused to testify before a
grand jury after an order under the Immunity Act of 1954 was granted by the
district court directing the petitioner to testify. Id. at 423-25.
181. Id. at 430. The Court concluded that immunity need only protect the
witness from testimony that might expose him to a criminal charge. Id. at 43031.
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forced to give testimony leading to the infliction of 'penalties affixed to the criminal acts.' "182 Thus, under Ullman, the fifth
amendment privilege ceases once the danger of incrimination
ceases. This reasoning should be applied with equal force to the
communication privileges.
With respect to the marital privilege we note a similar philosophical progression from the unity of husband and wife' 8 3 which
led to a rule of total spousal incompetency, 8 4 through the suggestion of a constitutional right to privacy,' 8 5 and, finally, to the
view of spousal equality expressed in Trammel.' 8 6 If the Trammel
Court is correct that the spousal privilege does not prevent the
Government from gaining information from one spouse about
the other, then certain implications flow therefrom. Certainly,
the Court's use of the term, "in the courtroom" must be read to
mean "against the spouse as a defendant." If the marital privilege protects only against "the spouse's testimony in the courtroom," it arguably follows that there is no general right to
prevent the revelation of incriminating and embarrassing information in another courtroom where the spouse is not on trial.
Therefore, Trammel indicates that the mere fact that a spouse may
reveal sordid or embarrassing details of the relationship in a public setting is insufficient to compel his or her silence.
The point is not that legal justifications for the privileges are
unclear or poorly reasoned, but that they change to accommodate
182. Id. at 439 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886)).
183. See, e.g., Moy v. United States, 254 U.S. 189, 195 (1920) (in criminal
prosecution, wife is not competent to testify for her husband either generally or
by contradicting incriminating testimony); Graves v. United States, 150 U.S. 118
(1893) (wife of person accused of crime is not competent to testify either on his
own behalf or on behalf of government); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 175, § 2227.
184. See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 44; J. MAGUIRE, supra note 124, at 78-92. See
also Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 209, 220-23 (1839). It was not until 1933
that federal courts allowed one spouse to testify in favor of the other spouse. See
Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933).
185. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (marital relationship gives rise to "penumbral" constitutional right of privacy); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 539 (1960) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (law prohibiting use of
contraceptives by married couple violates right of privacy).
186. 445 U.S. at 52. The Trammel Court summarized the extinction of the
rationale underlying the old rule of marital privilege:
The ancient foundations for so sweeping a privilege have long since
disappeared. Nowhere in the common-law world-indeed in any modem society-is a woman regarded as a chattel or demeaned by denial of

a separate legal identity and the dignity associated with recognition as a
whole human being.
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different societal perceptions and demands.1 87 Part of the reason
for this change is a change in the way we interpret our constitutional rights. For example, twenty-five years ago no one seriously
would have argued that a defendant testifying at a suppression
hearing was entitled to immunity. Now such a concept is so universally accepted that the Supreme Court in the United States has
employed it to change the rules of standing in order to prevent
what in the view of the majority would be over-application of the
fourth amendment. 8 8 Similarly, Washington, Davis, and Chambers
compel us, in the face of the suppression of evidence of a defendant's innocence, to question the traditional rationale behind the
privileges themselves.
In order to enforce a criminal defendant's constitutional
rights to a fair trial and to present evidence in his own behalf, we
must recognize that, whatever the historical basis of the communication privileges might be, their only valid contemporary basis
is that of protecting the privilege-holder against the evil of prosecution based on the contents of a privileged communication. As
use immunity protects a privilege-holder from just that evil, there
is no valid contemporary justification for permitting a holder of a
communication privilege to withhold information that might tend
to exculpate a criminal defendant.
2.

The Courts Are Adequately Equipped to Protect the PrivilegeHolder's Reputation
Even if the communication privileges should be recognized

187. For example, society now recognizes a therapist-client privilege. See
Louisell, The Psychologist in Today's Legal World: Part/, 41 MINN. L. REV. 731, 734
(1957) (all six states that have granted psychologist's clients privilege of confidential communication have granted it status equivalent to attorney-client privilege). This newly recognized privilege even has been exalted above the
traditional physician-patient privilege. Id. But cf 8.1. WIGMORE, supra note 175,

§ 2380(a), at 828-32 (three of Wigmore's four factors for determining the existance of privilege are unsatisfied by the doctor-patient relationship).
188. See United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980). The Salvucci Court
held that, in view of the Simmons decision, automatic standing is no longer constitutionally necessary. Id. at 95. For a discussion of Simmons, see supra notes 6577 and accompanying text. In striking down the automatic standing rule in
Salvucci, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, stated: "The doctrine now
serves only to afford a windfall to defendants whose fourth amendment rights
have not been violated. We are unwilling to tolerate the exclusion of probative
evidence under such circumstances .... " 448 U.S. at 95 (emphasis in original).
See also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). In Rakas, the Court declared,
"Each time the exclusionary rule is applied it exacts a substantial social cost for
the vindication of Fourth Amendment rights. Relevant and reliable evidence is
kept from the trier of fact and the search for truth at trial is deflected." Id. at
137.
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as continuing to provide protection to their holders' reputations,
it does not necessarily follow that an occasional invasion of the
privileges will result in such harm. Just as a court can employ in
camera hearings to protect a witness from threat of future prosecution, the court can employ such hearings to ensure that the contents of privileged communications are not publicly disclosed. In
addition, the court can employ other procedures to preserve the
witness' reputation, including sealing the record of the witness'
testimony, clearing the courtroom during the witness' testimony,
and imposing limitations on counsel's right to make comments
concerning the testimony outside the courtroom. 8 9 While some
of the options available to the court arguably curtail cherished
first amendment liberties, our first amendment jurisprudence approves the use of such drastic remedies when the need for such
protection is shown to be "overriding," and the use of the remedy
is limited.190
3.

The Defendant's ConstitutionalRights Outweigh the Interests of the
Privilege-Holder

Even if the limited invasion of the communication privileges
advocated should result in harm to the reputation of the privilege-holder, the harm that non-disclosure would inflict upon a defendant, who is thereby deprived of his constitutional rights,
clearly outweighs any privacy concerns favoring strict adherence
to the privileges. Privacy concerns simply are insufficient to override defendants' constitutional rights.
In Davis v. Alaska,' 9 ' the Supreme Court recognized that
"embarrassment" to the privilege-holder "or his family" by disclosure was outweighed by the defendant's right to probe the bias
of a crucial witness against him.' 92 Admittedly, the situation of
the communication privilege-holder in our hypothetical is distin189. See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, 608 F.2d 741, 747 (9th Cir. 1979)
(sixth amendment right to public trial does not preclude trial judge from limiting public access to courtroom during testimony of witness where such exclusion was necessary to protect witness and family from harm).
190. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982)
(right of access to criminal trials is of constitutional stature, but not absolute);
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 (1980) ("[a]bsent an
overriding interest articulated in findings, the trial of a criminal case must be
open to the public"); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 393 (1979) (suppression hearing can be closed when right to access is outweighed by defendant's right to fair trial).
191. 415 U.S. 308 (1974). For a discussion of Davis, see supra notes 18-27
and accompanying text.
192. 415 U.S. 319.
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guishable from that of the prosecution's witness in Davis in that
the Davis witness already had involved himself in the defendant's
trial, whereas, the communication privilege-holder in our hypothetical is uninvolved in the defendant's trial, and desires to remain uninvolved. This distinction, however, should be
insufficient to tilt the balance in favor of the privilege-holder.
In 1904, Professor Wigmore laid down the now universally
accepted test of when a privilege might be recognized. His test
involves a classic balancing of interests:
(1)
(2)

(3)
(4)

The communications must originate in a confidence
that they will not be disclosed.
The element of confidentiality must be essential to the
full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
The relation must be one which in the opinion of the
community ought to be sedulously fostered.
The injury that would inure to the relation by the
disclosure of the communications must be greater
than the benefit thereby gained for the correct dispo93
sal of litigation.1

Unfortunately, by the time Wigmore wrote, the American
courts were mechanically applying rules of privilege to bar testimony. While the overwhelming majority of courts claim to accept
the Wigmore test,19 4 the elements rarely are applied to the facts.
In particular, courts consistently fail to balance the factors of injury and benefit.' 9 5 When balancing does occur, the question
usually is framed in terms of the existence or nonexistence of the
privilege rather than in terms of balancing the injury against the
benefit. To avoid this balancing, the courts have developed a
number of elaborate fictions to defeat claims of privilege. For example, courts have held that the attorney-client privilege does not
193. 8J. WIGMORE, supra note 175, § 2285, at 527. See also Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in FederalCourt Today, 31 TUL. L. REV.
101 (1956). Professor Louisell states that "it may be that Wigmore, despite his
monumental contribution to the law of privileges, has conduced to the current
confusion by his emphasis on strictly utilitarian bases for the privileges-bases
which are sometimes highly conjectural and defy scientific validation." Id. at
111.
194. For cases purporting to follow these guidelines, see 8 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 175, § 2285, at 527 n.2.
195. See Note, supra note 145, at 467-68. Courts rarely engage in any balancing because the privilege requires certainty of application to avoid chilling
privileged communications. Id.
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apply to advice about future criminal acts or intentional torts, 9 6
98
the client's identity, 19 7 or the client's whereabouts.1
Perhaps the reason underlying the American courts' consistent failure to apply the Wigmorean balancing analysis lies in the
courts' perception of strong public policy grounds that support
the general conclusion that the injury caused by recognizing the
existence of a communication privilege in certain circumstances is
always greater than the benefit gained thereby. For example, no
matter how strict the confidence or how important the relationship, the courts have found that it simply is against public policy
to protect client disclosure to their lawyer about crimes the client
intends to commit. 19 9 Thus, summoned before a grand jury, a
lawyer receiving information of his client's future criminal intent
can be compelled to reveal the confidence in the face of any claim
of privilege.
Even if it is recognized that all of the fears rejected in Davis
and Ullman may materialize after compelled disclosure in a criminal case, the direct harm to the privileges still must be viewed as
196. See, e.g., IT&T v. United Tel. Co., 60 F.R.D. 177, 180 (M.D. Fla. 1973)
(exception to privilege where communication is made to assist in commission of

crime or fraud);

MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

DR 4-101(c)(3)

(1982) (lawyer may reveal client's intention to commit crime or information nec-

essary to prevent crime); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.6(b)(2) (Proposed Final Draft 1981); ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Opinion 314 (1965); Id., Opinion 202 (1940); Note,
supra note 145, at 467, 471-73.
197. See ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Opinion 150 (1963). But see Tillotson v. Boughner, 350 F.2d 663, 666 (7th Cir. 1962)
(in tax case, attorney was not required to disclose client's name because disclosure would lead to disclosure of client's motive for seeking advice); Baird v.
Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 629-30 (9th Cir. 1960) (attorney was not required to
disclose client's name to Internal Revenue Service).

198. MODEL CODE
ABA COMM. ON ETHICS

OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (c) (2)
AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Opinion 155

(1982);
(1936).

See also United States v. Woodruff, 383 F. Supp. 696 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (communications between lawyer and client with respect to time of trial are not privileged). But see Brennan v. Brennan, 281 Pa. Super. 362, 422 A.2d 510 (1980).
The Brennan opinion elevated mechanistic reasoning to an art form by holding
that the whereabouts of a client who removed himself and his children after a
temporary custody order was privileged despite the fact that the client was frustrating the issuance of a final order by defeating the court's jurisdiction. Id. at
357-77, 422 A.2d at 516-17. The court did give plaintiff the chance, on record,
to demonstrate that the interests of justice clearly would be frustrated by upholding the privilege. Id. at 377, 422 A.2d at 517. In dissent, Judge Price argued that the administration ofjustice had been impeded because one year had
passed since the filing of the complaint. Id. at 381-82, 422 A.2d at 520 (Price,J,
dissenting).
199. It has been suggested that the public policy which the courts purport
to advance is a judicial creation. See D. KAIRYS, THE POLICTICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 10, 14 (1982).
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slight in relation to the corresponding harm that would result to
the defendant if the privileges are unconditionally honored. In
the first place, the percentage of cases is slight in which defense
counsel can request immunity. In addition, the case law under
Smith indicates that the number of cases in which immunity is
granted are fewer still.200 Moveover, application of Wigmore's
fourth criterion favors infringement upon the privilege where the
benefit to be gained outweighs any injury that may inure to the
privilege-holder. Acquittal of the innocent is, and ought to remain, one of the highest priorities of our judicial system. Certainly a majority of the Supreme Court has applied the converse
of this principle of balancing with a vengeance in dealing with the
fourth and fifth amendments' exclusionary rule. 20 1 Do not the
due process clause and the sixth amendment compel an
equivalent result in criminal trials?
The communication privileges have been long recognized as
evidentiary exclusionary rules.2 0 2 Their interrelationship with a
defendant's rights, however, has been ignord or overlooked because privileges generally work to prevent the prosecution or
conviction of the privilege-holder rather than the acquittal of a
third person. While society has tolerated such a result in the past,
the time has come for the courts to recognize that society no
longer is content with a strict adherence to the communication
privileges where they jeopardize the constitutional rights of a
criminal defendant.
C.

Danger of Chilling the Relationship Underlying the Privilege

The final question that must be addressed is whether the fear
of potential disclosure of privileged communications will chill the
underlying relationships that the communication privileges protect. Many scholars and practicing attorneys have argued that the
200. See supra notes 108-09.
201. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief
Justice Burger lamented:
[TIoday's holding fulfills Judge (later Mr. Justice) Cardozo's grim
prophecy that someday some court might carry the exclusionary rule to
the absurd extent that its operative effect would exclude evidence relating to the body of a murder victim because of the means by which it was
found.
Id. at 416 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 49697 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,
242 (1973); Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 41213 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637-38
(1965).
202. See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50; 5 J. BENTHAM, supra note 146, at 300-50.
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confidential relationships protected by the various privileges
should be free of any conditions that might tend to chill the
2 03
relationship.
1. The Attorney-Client Privilege
Many commentators argue that the attorney-client relationship exists to permit the attorney to represent the client, and to
give advice effectively within the limits of the law. The privilege,
they contend, facilitates complete revelation of all relevant information necessary for the attorney to render effective advice and
representation. 20 4 If, the argument runs, there is a possibility that
an attorney might be compelled to breach the privilege, the client
might withhold potentially damaging information. 20 5 It is further
argued that if clients withhold information, attorneys cannot possibly render effective advice or representation. This argument
carries great weight with respect to the attorney-client privilege,
where the disclosures a court is likely to compel often form the
basis for why the client consulted the attorney in the first instance. Even if not the primary reason for such consultation, the
communication of such information flows from the essence of the
relationship.
While the fear that the limited invasion of the communication
privileges advocated in this article might tend to have a chilling
effect upon the relationships underlying such privileges cannot be
dismissed casually, it is suggested that the fear is both greatly exaggerated and largely theoretical. In criminal cases, the overwhelming majority of clients hire attorneys or have them
appointed after being indicted or charged with a criminal offense.
An attorney is infrequently retained, and rarely appointed, to give
advice to uncharged clients in the criminal context.20 6 Thus,
203. See 8J. WIGMORE, supra note 175, § 2290, at 522; Note, supra note 145,
at 465-66; Letter from Benjamen Lerner to Louis Nateli, supra note 144.
204. Note, supra note 145, at 465-66.
205. Public defenders argue that client distrust of appointed lawyers already is high because many clients feel that public defenders do not render effective representation because, inter alia, they work for the state. The public
defenders who espouse this opinion argue that a general recognition that the
attorney-client privilege may be invaded effectively will end any significant revelation of incriminating secrets. See Letter from Benjamin Lerner to Louis Natali,
supra note 144.
206. Statistics from a large public defender office reveal that of over 40,000
client contacts annually, fewer than 1% of all requests were for the purpose of
obtaining legal advice before being formally charged. Interview with Robert Arthur, Chief Archivist, Defender Association of Philadelphia (Feb. 2, 1985). Such
requests were so infrequent that there was no separate archival category for
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when a client consults with an attorney in a criminal context, the
client generally faces a direct danger of prosecution, and reveals
confidences and secrets to his attorney in order to assist the attorney in the defense of a particular charge. There are, however,
occasions where a client will reveal information to his attorney
about another crime with which he is not then charged. This is
precisely what happened in the Wilkinson case, where a client who
was charged only with a car firebombing admitted to his attorney
that he had committed a house firebombing and a murder as
well.2 0 7 It hardly seems that the client's secondary revelation was
"necessary" to the relationship for which the attorney was appointed or retained. Nor can it be said that a hesitancy or refusal
to seek advice about the uncharged case would have hampered
the attorney's representation of the client.
Bentham, a fierce opponent of all privileges, argued that the
attorney-client privilege should not prevent revelation of client
secrets. He discussed the potential chill upon the right to counsel
in a rather archaic but cogent manner:
But if such confidence, when reposed, is permitted
to be violated, and if this be known, (which, if such be
the law, it will be), the consequence will be, that no such
confidence will be reposed. Not reposed?-Well: and if
it be not, wherein will consist the mischief? The man by
the supposition is guilty; if not, by the supposition there
is nothing to betray: let the law adviser say everything
he has heard, everything he can have heard from his client, the client cannot have any thing to fear from it.
That it will often happen that in the case supposed no
such confidence will be reposed, is natural enough: the
first thing the advocate or attorney will say to his client,
will be,-remember that, whatever you say to me, I shall
be obliged to tell, if asked about it. What, then, will be
the consequence? That a guilty person will not in general be able to derive quite so much assistance from his
law adviser, in the way of concerting a false defen[s]e as
208
he may do at present.
them; instead they were maintained with requests for return of property and
extension of time to pay fines. Id.
207. For a further discussion of Wilkinson, see supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text.
208. 5J. BENTHAM, supra note 146, at 303-04. See also Comment, Functional
Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professions: Its Implicationsfor the PrivilegedCommunications Doctrine, 71 YALE LJ. 1226, 1261-63, 1269-77 (1962).
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Although Bentham's simplistic arguments have been rebuf-

fed by many lawyers, judges, and scholars,2 09 the arguments retain value for their recognition of the practical problems inuring
in the attorney-client relationship. It is suggested that Bentham's
analysis of the solution to these problems is both naive and inac-

curate, but he does identify the problem faced by an attorney
counseling a client, when the client desires to disclose information about an offense for which someone else has been charged.
If we join in the colloquy used by Bentham we might imagine
the following:
Client: I am charged with the crime of murder, if I tell

you what happened would you ever be compelled to reveal it?
Attorney: No.
Client: But what about this defense witness immunity
rule as set out in Smith?
Attorney: That would only apply if you possessed information that you committed a crime and not someone else
who happened to be so charged. If you have such information and tell me, I could, under some circumstances,
be compelled to reveal it.
Assuming the client did possess information which might exculpate another defendant, and that the client desired to keep
that information secret, the client's next response would take one
of the following forms: "I have no such information and let's get
on with the defense of my case" or "Yes, I have such information
but I will not tell you because I want to avoid a Smith scenario."
While the actual wording is somewhat fanciful and contrived,
the underlying realities are well founded. A client, desiring to
avoid public disclosure of his secrets, very well may withhold information from his attorney. But does this impermissibly chill the
relationship? The answer seems to be that the relationship will be
chilled, but such chill or limitation is socially desirable. The danger of chill to the relationship is outweighed by the greater harm
that will be suffered by a defendant who is prevented from
presenting exculpatory evidence as a result of the recognition of a
privilege.
Of course there is another group of clients, a small but still
legally significant minoritory, who do seek advice from attorneys
209. See generally 8J. WIGMORE, supra note 175, § 2291, at 551-54.
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in anticipation of arrest or indictment. Many of these cases involve coconspirators who have not yet been charged, and some
probably involve situations, like that in Wilkinson, where a client
seeks the advice of an appointed or retained attorney about an
unrelated offense. Such clients have a recognized and legitimate
need to obtain legal advice and counsel, but if their attorney can
be compelled to disclose client confidences, these clients might
choose to forego legal assistance in such matters. Are these not
the clients who will ask, "If I possess information about a crime
with which another is charged, is it possible you will be compelled
to testify in that case?"
It seems that the answer, "Yes, but it cannot be used against
you" will be of little comfort. Certainly, the client will desire to
avoid placing himself in a position where his attorney's compelled
210
revelations will start the prosecution looking in his direction,
and might carry the potential for loss of employment, severe disruption of family life, and social disgrace.2 1 ' Let us assume two
possibilities: (1) The client does not disclose the information; or
(2) the client does disclose the information to his attorney and
obtains appropriate advice.
In the first situation, the client will be harmed by his failure
to disclose the information only if the information would aid his
attorney in properly representing the client's interests. While
there are conceivable situations where a client might be harmed
by his failure to make a complete disclosure to his attorney about
uncharged crimes, such situations will rarely exist. For the most
part, the client's disclosure or lack of disclosure of information
tending to implicate the client in a crime other than that for which
he is charged will neither aid nor hinder the client's attorney in
rendering proper representation. In fact, if any harm occurs at all
from the client's failure to disclose such information, it is more
likely to occur from the fact that the client's attorney will be unable to aid an innocent defendant who might have the misfortune
to be charged with the crime committed by the attorney's client.
Similarly, in the situation in which the client does disclose to his
attorney, no harm will come to the client because the chances are
that the attorney never will be required to divulge the content of
the client's disclosure. Moreover, even where the attorney is re210. For a discussion of why such a fear is illusory, see supra notes 206-09
and accompanying text.
211. For a discussion of how the courts can protect a party from the realization of such fears, see supra notes 207-08 and accompanying text.
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quired to make such a disclosure, justice still will be served for the
reasons discussed throughout this article.
2.

Other Privileges

None of the other privileges has achieved anything like the
mechanistic crystallization of the attorney-client privilege. Pro21 2
fessor Wigmore did not recognize the doctor-patient privilege,
and he only grudgingly agreed that his fourth criteria was satisfied
2 13
by the husband-wife privilege.
While these privileges spring from various privacy concerns,
it hardly can be said that the primary purpose of any was the exclusion of confidential information in a trial of someone other
than the privilege-holder. Rather, their purpose is to prevent the
in-court use of the privilege-holder's secrets against the privilegeholder. In most instances the confidences are revealed for reasons such as a need for medical or psychiatric treatment, a religious need to confess one's sins, or simply because the privilegeholder desires to share his or her secrets with his or her spouse.
These relationships will not cease nor will they suffer any serious
effect if the due process clause and the sixth amendment infrequently require discharge of a confidence. Since the benefit
gained by acquitting the innocent is enormous, and the potential
injury to the relationship is virtually impossible to calculate, revelation always should be required. Secondary effects or injuries
may flow, but these rarely will alter the underlying relationship.
People will not stop marrying or stop confiding in their spouses
because of the possibility that use immunity may be conferred on
one or the other. Moreover, if a wife receives some awful confi212. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 175, § 2380(a), at 828-32. Professor Wigmore cogently argued that the first, second and fourth of his criteria are "emphatically" not met in the case of the physician-patient relationship, stating:
Of the kinds of ailments that are commonly claimed as the subject of
the privilege, there is seldom an instance where it is not ludicrous to
suggest that the party cared at the time to preserve the knowledge of it
from any person but the physician. From asthma to broken ribs, from
influenza to tetanus, the facts of the disease are not only disclosable
without shame, but are in fact often publicly known and knowable by
everyone-by everyone except the appointed investigators of truth.
Id. at 830. For Wigmore's four criteria, see supra text accompanying note 193.

See also Morgan, Forwardto

MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE

at 28 (1942). Professor

Morgan also centers his analysis on lack of expectation or knowledge of the privilege, stating, "[The patient] has no idea whether communication to a physician
is or is not privileged." Id. See generally Chafee, PrivilegedCommunications: IsJustice Served or Obstructed by Closing the Doctor's Mouth on the Witness Stand?, 52 YALE
LJ. 607 (1943).
213. 8J. WIGMORE, supra note 175, § 2332, at 642-43.
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dence from her husband, it would seem that if the underlying
facts themselves do not destroy the relationship, in-court disclosure (often years later) will do little additional damage. 2 14 There
is also a strong argument that marital communications take place
without any knowledge or expectation of a privilege. 2 15 It is difficult to explain the difference in treatment between husband-wife
confidences, which are protected, and parent-child and sisterbrother confidences, which are not. The damage to family harmony is no different in any of the cases, but the law chooses to
2 16
protect only the former.
Similarly, people consult psychiatrists and therapists for purposes of treatment and cure. Doctors rarely are required to share
a confidence in the practice of their craft, 2 17 but often treatment
of mental problems only will occur after revelation of some dark
secret. 2 18 Will the possibility of disclosure chill the therapeutic
214. See Hutchins and Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence:
Family Relations, 13 MINN. L. REV. 675, 675-77 (1929).
215. Id. at 682, 686. The authors point out that there is no evidence that
lawyers-because they are aware of the privilege-enjoy great domestic harmony. Id. at 682. But see Reutlinger, Policy, Privacy, and Prerogatives: A Critical
Examination of the Proposed FederalRules of Evidence as They Affect Marital Privilege,61
CALIF. L. REV. 1353, 1374-78 (1973) (asserting that increase in law suits and
media coverage has increased public awareness of husband-wife privilege); see
also W. FAULKNER, Was in Go DOWN MOSEs 3 (Vintage ed. 1973) (fictional account of loveable bootlegger who marries to close the mouth of the entire
family).
216. Family privilege has been recognized in the following cases: People v.
Fitzgerald, 101 Misc. 2d 712, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309 (1979) (holding that parentchild privilege exists in New York); In re A. and M., 61 A.D.2d 426, 403 N.Y.S.2d
375 (App. Div. 1978) (communication by minor to parent within family relationship may be privileged). The privilege was rejected in the following cases: In re
Kinov, 326 F. Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (denying existence of parent-child privilege); In re Terry W., 59 Cal. App. 3d 745, 130 Cal. Rptr. 913 (1976) (rejecting
judicially created parent-child privilege). See generally Coburn, Child-Parent Communications: Spare the Privilege and Spoil the Child, 74 DICK. L. REV. 599 (1970);
Note, Questioning the Recognition of a Parent-Child Testimonial Privileges, 45 ALB. L.
REV. 142 (1980); Comment, From the Mouths of Babes: Does the ConstitutionalRight
of Privacy Mandate Parent-Child Privilege?, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1002; Comment,
The Child-ParentPrivilege: A Proposal,47 FORDHAM L. REV. 771 (1979); Comment,
Recognition of a Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege, 23 ST. Louis U.LJ. 676 (1979);
Comment, Confidential Communication Between Parent and Child. A Constitutional
Right, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 811 (1979).
217. See 8J. WIGMORE, supra note 175, § 2380(a), at 829.
218. See Louisell, supra note 187. Professor Louisell commented:
Implicit in the nature and processes of psychodiagnosis and psychotherapy is a profound prying into the most hidden aspects of personality and character, a prying often productive of disclosure of secrets
theretofore unknown even to the conscious mind of the patient himself.
Sometimes the processes are aided by hypnosis or drugs, temporarily
putting beyond control of the patient all deliberate choice as to the extent, continuation or termination of the inquiry. Obviously disclosure
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process? Historically, there is no basis for such an argument.
Prior to the 1950's the psychologist or psychiatric privilege rarely
was recognized in criminal cases or in civil cases. 2 19 There is no
evidence, however, that the absence of a bar to in-court disclosure
has prevented anyone from seeking psychodiagnosis or that the
profession somehow was hampered in its mission. Not only is
there no evidence to support the chill theory, there also is no evidence that the enactment of statutory protection created a thaw
2 20
which impelled an avalanche upon the analyst's couch.
Pragmatically, there also is no support for arguing that infrequent disclosure will restrict treatment. 2 2' The courts have required therapists to warn the intended victim of a patient's threat
2 22
if there is a reasonable belief that the patient will carry it out,
and to answer depositions concerning the mental history of a patient where it is relevant. 22 3 Such disclosures do not appear to
have caused any chilling effect upon therapist-client relationship.
The possibility of compulsion to therapist is no greater a threat to
the process than the imposition of that liability on the practitioner
at large of data thus procured might have the most significant consequences for the reputation and status of the patient, and typically he is
well aware of the potentialities of disclosure. It is hard to see how the
psychodiagnositc and psychotherapeutic functions adequately can be
carried on in the absence of a pervading attitude of privacy and
confidentiality.
Id. at 745. See also Taylor v. United States, 22 F.2d 398, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1955) ("a
psychiatrist must love his patient's confidence or he cannot help him"); GROUP
FOR ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, REPORT No. 45, at 92 (1960).
219. See, e.g., 8J. WIGMORE, supra note 175, § 2286, at 534 n.23 (collecting
state statutes from the 1950's which granted the same type of privilege to psychologist-client
communications as
was granted
to attorney-client
communications).
220. See Comment, supra note 208, at 1265-69.
221. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602-03 (1977) (state data bank containing names and addresses of persons obtaining prescription drugs is constitutional even if some patients are deterred from seeking appropriate treatment
because of fear of stigmatization); In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P.2d 557,
85 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1970) (requiring psychotherapists to answer questions on limited basis at deposition concerning treatment of patient who was litigant). See
also Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 79-81 (1976) (state requirement of record keeping of abortions performed is not constitutionally impermissible); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 411 (1981) (upholding statute requiring
doctor to notify parents before performing abortion on unemancipated minor).

But see id. at 439 n.25 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing medical authorities who
claim that reporting requirements deter or delay patients from seeking abortion
thus increasing health risks).
222. Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 13 Cal. 3d 177, 529 P.2d 553,
118 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1973) rev'd in part on reh 'g, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131
Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
223. In re Lifshuftz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1970).
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for failure to protect a person from impending harm. Application
of Wigmore's test also suggests that the benefit to be gained by
nondisclosure is slight but that the danger of improper disposition of the litigation is great.
When we move to other privacy interests there is even less
justification for silence. The courts already have defined the contours of the newsman's 22 4 and rape counselor's privileges 22 5 and
it is clear that a defendant's need to exculpate himself prevails
2 26
over these interests.
V.

PROCEDURE FOR BALANCING RIGHTS

Once a request is made for use immunity to the witness privilege-holder or to the other party to the privilege, the court should
employ the procedure detailed in Nixon v. United States. 22 7 The
court should indulge the presumption that the testimony is privileged, shifting the burden to the requesting party to demonstrate
that the testimony is essential to the justice of the pending
case.2 2 8 In applying this test the requesting party also should satisfy the Smith standard that the testimony is "clearly exculpatory."' 22 9 This last requirement would serve to ensure that the
privilege is not irresponsibly invaded. In camera inspection and
testimony should be employed to determine overbroad claims
and to protect other privileged matters; and production of cumulative or collateral evidence should not be permitted in the face of
a claim of privilege. Again, a court should recognize, through
Washington, Davis, and Chambers, the testimony which clearly shows
that someone other than the defendant committed the charged
crime, or which directly impeaches a witness against the defendant, is critical. Invasion of the privilege should be allowed in
230
those cases.
224. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Hammarley v. Superior
Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d 888, 159 Cal. Rptr. 608 (1979); In re Farber, 78 NJ. 259,
394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978). But see NewJersey v. Boiardo, 82
N.J. 446, 414 A.2d 414 (1980).
225. In re Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, 494 Pa. 15, 428 A.2d 126 (1981).
226. See generally Tanford & Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth
Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 544 (1980).
227. 418 U.S. 683, 710-713 (1974). For a discussion of Nixon, see supra
notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
228. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 713 (requiring that prosecutor demonstrate that
presidential material was essential to criminal case) (quoting United States v.
Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 192 (No. 14,692 (C.C. Va. 1807)).
229. Smith, 615 F.2d at 972. For a discussion of Smith, see supra notes 88106 and accompanying text.
230. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 74.2, at 1278-80 (3d ed. 1984).
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CONCLUSION

A defendant's due process and sixth amendment rights to
present exculpatory evidence via cross-examination or direct examination mandate that courts employ the remedy of use immunity. Defense witnesses are entitled to protection from
prosecution, but should not be allowed to remain silent when the
alternative is conviction of the innocent. Moreover, the courts
possess the power to immunize defense witnesses when the prosecutor refuses to do so.
Use immunity completely protects the witness by prohibiting
his testimony and its fruits from being used against him. If the
witness is fully protected, it follows that the witness' declaration
against penal interest made in confidence may also be compelled.
If these revelations may not be used against the witness in court he
should not be heard to complain.
While the communication privileges have different, privacybased foundations, there is no legal right to prevent revelation as
opposed to in-court use against the privilege-holder. Indirect injury to a privileged relationship, or social disability, are not protected by legal privileges. Finally, while there is some danger that
such relationships could be chilled, with the attendant dysfunction, this threat is slight and is justified by the benefit to society
flowing from revelation. In sum, the right to everyman's evidence
includes the right to invade privileges to protect a criminal defendant's sixth amendment rights.
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